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The first South African all-inclusive elections marked a turning point and introduced a new
era of democracy. In the aftermath of political transition, the country still faces many social
and spatial changes. Although social transformations relating to racial issues are undeniably
occurring, previously disadvantaged groups are still struggling with the consequences of
former apartheid rule (Habib & Southall, 2003) . Despite efforts by the new South African
government to create an equitable and non-racial society, a separation along class and racial
lines has intensified (2003). One manifestation of this division is the emerging reinforcement
of gated community' developments. These environments are popularly understood to be
"suburbs whose uniqueness and exclusiveness are defined by the amount of safety measures"
(Jurgen & Gnad, 2001). In the case of enclosed neighbourhoods, existing areas are closed-off
through booms and gates across roads. Many are fenced off or walled off as well , with a
limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at these points in some cases
(Low 2003).
Specific spatial characteristics contribute to the particular urban pattern present in most South
African cities. Urban environments are typified by fragmentation and spatial dislocation,
separation and mono-functional zoning, and by low-density suburban sprawl. Among other
reasons, these spatial characteristics also contribute to opportunities for crime (Landman,
2003). One of the goals of the proposed study is to challenge these popular conceptions of
gated community environments by highlighting the nature and impact of these
neighbourhoods on the privatisation of public space as well as to probe the 'real' reasons for
the move to gated enclosures especially as regards fortress mentalities and ethnocentric
tendencies (Durington, 2004). My research examines issues related to Muslim/Indian identity
with regard to spatial environment in Umhlanga Halls, a gated community established in
Umhlanga located north from the city centre of Durban in the KwaZulu-Natal province.
Although the majority of residents of gated communities in Umhlanga are white, the
community is also made up of various racial groups who were previously segregated in
I From a general point of view, gated communities are characterized by a number of security apparatuses
including high walls, boom gates, razor wire, electric fences and armed security companies (Low, 2003). Gated
communities take the idea of crime prevention through environmental design to its extreme, by applying the
principles of territoriality, defensible space, access control and image (Landman, 2003).
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separate urban spaces under the apartheid system (Durington, 2004). Thus, my research seeks
to explore if the same motivations for moving and purchasing homes in Umhlanga exist for
the Muslim/Indian2 racial group within these developments while examining the existence of
social tensions between these groups within the community.
Reasons for research
A motivation for doing this research is my own perception of crime in South African cities.
Five years ago, when I came to South Africa for my tertiary studies, I was taken aback by the
paranoia that many of my friends exhibited regarding security and crime. Indeed, crime has
been determined to be a major social problem in post-apartheid South Africa (Schonteich,
2002) and it is high levels of crime that are giving rise to major changes in the urban
landscape, such as defensive architecture and urbanism. Fear of crime as an influential factor
has in turn led to an international resurgence of crime prevention through environmental
design approaches, including harsher law enforcement, and increased focus on crime
prevention (Landman, 2003). As a result, gated community developments have expanded
during the past five years in South Africa due to perceptions relating to high crime rates.
However, despite a lack of valid crime statistics, the majority of people in enclosed
neighbourhoods feel safer (Booyzen, 2000). According to Booyzen, "peoples' perceptions of
crime rates are closely linked to their perceptions of safety. People inside the enclave
definitely feel that crime rates are lower in their area" (2000: 61).
Another major motivation was the issue of housing in the 'new South Africa'. Although the
division of those living in gated areas from those living in less protected settings is
increasingly along economic rather than merely racial lines (Kruger et al., 1997), these
divisions defer largely to the structural socio-historical opportunities left behind by apartheid'
(Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). With current housing problems being dealt with by the government
in an effort towards creating sustainable communities, the question of what suburban
development means in post-apartheid South Africa becomes developmentally and ethically
problematic. This is especially relevant in regards to private-land developers such as
Moreland Developers, who, actively promote the development of elite suburban areas similar
2 My reason for using the term 'Muslim/Indian' is because I am focusing on the Muslims of Indian origin only.
There are other Muslims of Malaysian origin primarily located in the Western Cape and commonly known as the
Cape Malays. However, the majority ofMuslims in the KZN province are of Indian descent.
3 Reference to the Group Areas Act passed during the 1960s whereby spatial and symbolic segregation was
widespread. During that time, the Indian community was stuck in between and invariably became partly invisible
and subsumed by the binary oppositions ofblack and white concentration (Hook & Vrdoljak, 200 1).
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to Umhlanga", in an attempt to privatise space and create new places'. As such, the Durban
Municipality's role in the perpetuation of these spatial inequalities is also explored.
Thirdly, I am interested in deconstructing the reasons for which a minority of Indian Muslims
who have 'fled' from previously segregated areas have chosen to settle in predominantly
white enclaved areas. The move of Indian Muslims to enclaves located far away from their
previously segregated areas raises the concern of population movements in the 'new' South
Africa. To avoid reductionism, the Muslim community in South Africa is considered in terms
of its subgroups. Taking the Muslim ummah6 as marker, I examine the historical migration of
Indian Muslims to South Africa and investigate the reasons for population shifts that have
occurred in gated communities in an attempt to gauge the identity variables of that
community. In seeking to unpack three main issues dealing with the inter-relatedness of the
categories of space, power and identity, its manifestations among Muslim residents in
Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest and the reasons for which the minority rich Muslims
seek to segregate themselves in enclosed spaces, I hope to understand the identity markers
that inform the behavioural reasons for their move.
Structure
The dissertation is structured in three sections. Chapter 2 deals with issues relating to the
anthropology of space and urbanization to introduce concepts such as urban design,
architecture and urbanization. Chapter 3 introduces discourses of globalisation and identity
formation. The theories presented in those two chapters form the theoretical basis from which
my data collected is comprehended and analysed. Chapter 4 details fieldwork while
illustrating the theoretical arguments concerning the inter-relatedness of the categories of
space, power and identity and its manifestations among Muslim residents in Umhlanga Halls
and Umhlanga Crest, the motivations of my subject community 's choice to segregate itself
along class and ethnic lines in fortified gated developments; and, the factors in identity
4 Since its inception in 1992, the leading private leading private-land developer Moreland, the property division
of London and Johannesburg-listed Tongaat-Hulett group has developed the Zimbali Coastal Resort, Mount
Edgecombe Country Club Estates, Umhlanga Ridge, La Lucia Ridge, La Lucia Ridge Office Estate, Umhlanga
Ridge New Town Centre and the Empangeni Old Mill Industrial Estate.
5 Space refers to the surrounding environment that people inhabit. Places, however, are socially constructed or
manipulated spaces that are deliberately politicized, culturally relative and historically specific to match the
needs of people inhabiting those meaningful spaces.
6 The Ummah is the community of Allah (God) for Muslims. The Ummah transcends boundaries frontiers
nationalities, citizenship, linguistic differences and all other forms of cultural, political, economic or social
differences.
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formation among Muslim/Indian inhabitants of gated communities. The main methodology
used in this chapter is informed by ethnographic techniques as the research is of a qualitative
nature. The data gathering process includes participant observation, contextual research,
interviewing, and, archival research. The first phase examines the developmental history of
Umhlanga in order to elicit how companies, such as Moreland Developers, and political
entities that enable the construction of these fortified enclaves initiate development. Archival
research is used as a background to compare interviews and participant observation amongst a
small number of seven families selected for intensive participant study. The second phase
involves regular visits to Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest, making contacts, participating
in some of the women's activities in order to establish a relationship between my subject
community and myself?
Historically, ethnographic research has developed out of a concern to understand the
worldviews and ways of life of actual people from the 'inside' , in the contexts of their
everyday, lived experiences. The method of participant observation is the means by which
researchers have often done this. As its name suggests, it involves . researchers moving
between participating in a community - by deliberately immersing themselves in its everyday
rhythms and routines, developing relationships with people who can show and tell them what
is 'going on' there, and writing accounts of how these relationships developed and what was
learned from them - and observing a community - by sitting back and watching activities
which unfold in front of their eyes, recording their impressions of these activities in field
notes, tallies, drawings, photographs and other forms of material evidence (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1995). Its basic form can be described as a three-stage process in which the
researcher somehow, first gains access to a particular community, second, lives and/or works
among the people under study in order to take on their world views and ways of life and,
third, returns back to the academic context to make sense of this through writing up an
account of that community's 'culture' (1995).
7 As a scholar, my intention is to be honest and self-critical and to keep my results as tangible and intelligible as
possible. I have had the privilege of meeting and interacting with interesting people during my research , who
have given me permission to use their thoughts and opinions in my work. I honour their presence in the research
process . I do not presume to speak on their behalf, but to tell a story of my own experience with them and my
own interpretation of their circumstances, which may (hopefully) be of use to them.
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Chapter 5 forms part of my data analysis whereby I take on a personal voice, the voices of my
interviewees, and a professional voice. The three voices (active participant, biased researcher
and academic commentator) are employed so as to convey the immediacy of the field by
providing texture and variety in the style of writing. While I neither claim to speak on behalf
of my subject community nor make generalizations about peoples' opinions and behaviour, I
do undertake the difficult task of attempting to understand the reasons that inform my subject
community's choice to live in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest. The dissertation is
interspersed with a few photographs depicting settings, personal anecdotes, fieldwork notes
and quotes from known fellow academics related to the field. A bibliography and a list of
appendixes are provided at the end as reference. Furthermore, following the rules of
ethnographic practice, I make use of pseudonyms instead of using the real names of the
people I had the opportunity to work with. Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest are also
substitute names for the two gated communities I studied. All information provided by the
people I interviewed and interacted with has been approved and confidential information has
not been divulged.
Theory used
My research engages with Pierre Bourdieu's (1997) concept of 'habitus' and 'cultural capital'
in an attempt to highlight the various dynamics involved in the creation and perpetuation of
spatial segregation in identity formation, 'Habitus' is the word used by Bourdieu to define a
person's socially acquired 'dispositions', whereas cultural capital refers to the cultural
knowledge that people acquire through their upbringing, as well as through the socio-
economic status of their family environment, amongst other factors (Bourdieu, 1997). In
keeping with anthropological approaches to space and place, it is implied that various sites are
endowed with meaning only when they are invoked in practice, the combination of meaning
and action as expressed by Bourdieu (1997). In contemporary South Africa, the cultural
memory of apartheid and the institutional policy of demarcating space and establishing
boundaries by race under this institutional racist regime has been sidetracked by a new set of
politics that binds conceptions of space and place by race and class (Durington, 2004). Hence,
in using 'habitus' and cultural capital as conceptual frameworks, I attempt to unpack the
motivations for which spatial relocation is a need for my chosen community.
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Another theoretical marker used employs Arjun Appadurai's (1990) notion of global
ethnoscapes and globalisation, and its impacts on the restructuring of various socio-spatial
configurations. Global ethnoscapes correspond to global flows of people (transnational
migrations) and are inscribed as the restructuring of matrices of power in which social groups
are embedded. However, global ethnoscapes can also refer to the world's virtual communities
that are created through information and communications technologies. Hence, in addition to
transforming class relations, ethnoscapes can be interpreted as a series of gendered and
racialized processes. As the nodal points of global webs, urban locales constitute the socio-
spatial arenas within which ethnoscapes and capitalscapes'' meet, combining to produce
distinctive power configurations. To conceive of urban cities as socio-spatial articulations of
ethnoscapes and capitalscapes, Foucault's (1986) notion of "heterotopias'f is employed. The
term heterotopia provides a rich metaphor with which to imagine cityscapes, the microcosms
where global movements ofpeople and capital are condensed (Soja, 1989).
Thirdly, my dissertation uses Hall's (1996) theory of identity to explore the ways in which the
concept of identity "raises fundamental questions about how individuals fit into the
community and the social world and how identity can be seen as the interface between
subjective positions and social and cultural situations" (Hall, 1996). Under apartheid Muslims
had 'hybrid' identities that were situationally specific. Since 1994, Durban Muslims have
been repositioning themselves, in the context of an African-ruled democratic South Africa
(Vahed, 2000). Using Hall's notion of symbolic marking, that is, the way people make sense
of social relations and practices through inclusion and exclusion, I explore the underlying
dynamics that inform Muslim identity in gated communities.
Finally, I make use of Ruby's argument for reflexivity, which was developed from Fabian's
(1971:27) concept of the "dialectical unity between producer, production and product".
Fabian argues for the need for a ''unity of theory and praxis", that the "study of a
people.. .must be 'communicative' rather than 'observative', i.e. research works two-way,
involving the researcher's own involvement in the research process. Reflexivity stems from
8 Capitalscapes refers to the global movements of capital. The globalization of the circuit of productive capital
has enabled certain transnational corporations to become deterritorialised, essentially eliminating national social-
spatial considerations . Identified by Appadurai as the "fmanscape", the formation of transnational networks of
money capital represents the most striking feature ofglobalization.
9 Heter~topias are spac.esth~t.have been converted to utopic places in an attempt to reproduce the utopia aspired
~d desired by people inhabiting those places. Heterotopias are sites of difference, "capable of juxtaposing in a
smgle real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible".
6
the acknowledgement that we rely on our own presuppositions of the world, in our daily lives,
none of which is subjected to test. Most ofthe time this reliance on our instincts, thoughts and
personal perceptions do not hinder our understanding and interpretation of events occurring
around us, and social research is no different from other activities in this respect. Reflexivity
entails the conscious reflection on what seems problematic, while leaving open the possibility
that what currently is not problematic may in the future become so. Similarly, the fact that as
researchers, we invariably affect the dynamics of subject community relationships does not
mean that the validity of our findings is restricted to the data elicitation situations on which
we relied. One can minimize reactivity and/or monitor it, but also exploit it: peoples'
responses to the presence of the researcher may be as informative as how they react in other
situations. Another significant trait of the reflexive approach is the recognition that data
collected cannot be regarded as the ' final word of God', but rather, treated as a series of
inferences in which hypothetical patterns can be identified and their validity tested
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995).
Before formally beginning research for my thesis, I had (and still have) several ideological
misgivings. My main concern was twofold: firstly I was apprehensive about immersing
myself into a community that was, on many levels, very different from my own background
and, as a result, I was concerned about making some faux pas that could be irreparable. I did
not want my subject community to feel I was a probing academic, who was only using them
to get information that would be used for my own personal gain - my thesis. Secondly, I was
tom between my Islamic and secular values and was not sure how to negotiate my own
identity in relation to my subject community. As a Muslim woman, coming from a middle-
class intellectual background, I had always identified myself more in terms of my personal
achievements rather than as being Muslim. I was therefore apprehensive about having to de-
contextualise my own identity during my trips to Umhlanga where I felt the need to conform
to the rest of the women with whom I interacted. At the same time, I did not want to
compromise my integrity by projecting myself as someone I was not. Finally, I was concerned
with being involved in a research project where I might become one more in a long line of
often well intentioned academics, filmmakers, photographers, tourists whose presence serves
no purpose but to highlight social differences'", By locating my position as a researcher, as a
10 Some like Abu-Lughod (2000) argue that there is a need to fmd ways to write that work against the
typifications of communities that make them into distinct and alien cultures because of the way such distinctions
are inevitably hierarchical and tied to larger geopolitical structures of power. She suggests that in our own socio-
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Muslim woman; an ethnic and religious insider, but at the same time, as a local outsider, I
managed to gain internal access in the community in order to examine the dynamics and
tensions involved in data gathering, and eventually, in the final outcome.
Methods employed
During my data gathering process, I took part in some of the weekly religious activities
organized by the women of Umhlanga Halls. The activity concerned was called a Taalim, and
involved the collective recitation and reading of Hadiths and Surahs. Because I was
considered to be a guest and wanted to give the activity my full attention, it became
practically impossible for me to carry out formal interviews. In an attempt to avoid disrupting
the smooth flow of conversation, which usually took place after the recitations, I resorted to
using semi-structured interviews as a research strategy. This way, I was able to participate in
conversations without ostracizing myself as the researcher versus the insiders. In a case like
this, formal interviews would have come across as opportunistic and I did not want to make
the women feel that I had come to the Taalim only to gather data, but rather to partake in their
weekly activities in an attempt to integrate more with the community. Very few structured
interviews were carried out with some women on few other occasions, although I never used a
tape recorder, once again in my attempt to reduce distance between researcher and researched.
Very often, when the subject of caste and religious background was being discussed, I felt
compelled to share information about my own background as well in an effort to connect
more with some of my interviewees. I also interviewed the Imam of the Umhlanga Mosque,
located at the end of Emerald Park, another enclosed condominium, inhabited by several
Muslim families as well as non-Muslim families. I was however unable to have any in-depth
interviews with any of the men frequenting the mosque as the idea of a non-married woman
talking to unknown men would have been deemed inappropriate. The bulk of my information
was therefore from the women with whom I worked.
cultural worlds, whatever objectification takes place in forms of social-scientific representation is countered by
what I call the discourses of familiarity. In other words, although ethnographic and reflexive accounts sometimes
encompass peoples studied as a whole, it is crucial to consider the various intricacies and differences that
peoples of a community have, as it is impossible to consider the subject community as an entitylO in its own
right due to the countless variations involved. The main focus of working with the Muslim residents of the gated
communities was on the interplay between social structure, sentiment and ideology. I began to explore more
systematically what difference it would, might, or should make to be a religious insider but a local outsider -
both particular positions and identities - doing ethnography. By reproducing some conversations coupled with
my own fieldwork notes, I tried to recreate the immediacy ofbeing in the field.
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Contextual research to understand the developmental milieu in which gated communities are
imagined and created was carried out through interviews with the relevant surrounding
institutional entities that facilitate their construction (Durington, 2004). As such, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with members of Durban's Municipality Management,
and city planners responsible for the planning and marketing of Durban. The main focus of
those interviews was to gauge the Municipality's plans regarding the sustainable urban
development of the greater Durban area. I was referred to several websites reiterating the
Municipality's plans over the next ten years. Finally, newspapers, television presentations and
conversations with friends and colleagues provided data for the broader cultural context of
public life.
The ethnographic descriptions presented in the case study and data analysis that follows is
based on short-term fieldwork that I conducted in Umhlanga, from June to November 2004,
focusing on two gated communities, namely Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest. I was
concerned that participant-observation in the private spaces of peoples' homes would not
capture the 'real' nature of interactions and activities because of the fact that I was infringing
on the privacy of my subject community's homes. The data gathering methods I used were
very effective in providing various kinds of data that could be compared and analysed. The
content analysis of the field notes, interviews, maps and historical documents generated a
series of themes and theoretical insights into the cultural underpinnings of gated community
design and use . The observations, interviews, archival documentation, and spatial and
architectural maps and drawings provided distinct "texts" that I could read in relation to one
another in the search for breakdowns and incoherence that in turn reveal areas of cultural
conflict and contestation (Geertz, 1973). Lastly, my fieldwork notes provided insightful
anecdotes that allowed me to unpack various behavioural and trends that inform identity and
choice to live in gated communities.
One of the problems I encountered during my research included the relationship, during my
anthropological theorizing, between place, comparison, and generalization. Appadurai (1986)
argues that anthropological theorizing has been unwittingly affected by the shifting loci of its
production, such that comparison becomes difficult, for a critical dimension of variability (not
just in the data but in the relationship between observer and observed) is left unexamined.
Where comparisons (and generalizations) have been successful in anthropology, they have
occurred most often in the context of small-scale societies and have involved highly
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schematised aspects of social life, such as kinship terminology. However, as the societies
under consideration become more complex, literate, and historical, the kind of de-
contextualization that facilitates generalization becomes harder to accomplish. Comparison
becomes difficult when theoretical interest focuses on qualitative, subjective, and experiential
aspects of social life, rather than on quantitative, objective, or structural phenomena
(Appadurai, 1986). Therefore, in an attempt to avoid losing myself in generalizations, I state
clearly that the data gathered on my subject community does not necessarily represent a larger
community living in gated communities located in other parts of South Africa and the world.
My case study of Umhlanga is a tale of a place somewhat different from the more popular
studies done on global cities such as Los Angeles, San Francisco, London or of the central
(economic) mechanisms ofglobal transformation. However, the urban trend in South Africa is
not unconnected to the trajectory of cities in the West as well as if its transformation.
Histories of cities 'out there' are also histories of the West. Not just reflective of the 'dark
side' of modernity, then, the apartheid city is perhaps archetypically modem - contrary to
popular claims as to the archaic character of racism. The landscapes of racial segregation in
South Africa, for example, were described, created and managed by well-intentioned citizens,
not very dissimilar from those who housed the poor in Western cities and certainly strongly
influenced by these earlier reformers. Similarly, as some writers have demonstrated, the styles
and influences of colonial planning also found their way back to the centre (Rabinow, 1989a;
King, 1990). I have focused on the historical emergence, socio-political and economic
development, patterns of social use, and experiential meanings of gated community life and
design as a means of empirically working out the implications of the broader social
production of space and social construction of space perspectives. Although the research I
conducted was not a classic ethnographyll, the ethnographic illustrations highlight socio-
political factors, spatial practices, and efforts at social control that provide insight into the
conflicts that arise as different groups attempt to claim and define these urban spaces.
Furthermore, these processes elucidate the ways in which the forces and limits of the social
production of space and social construction of space are engaged and contested in public
arenas.
11 The research I conducted did not involve long-term participation with the subject community and therefore




SPACE, URBANIZATION, GATED COMMUNTIES & HETEROTOPIAS
The anthropology of place and space.
Space is not a "reflection of society," it is society ... Therefore, spatial forms, at least on our
planet , will be produced, as all other objects are, by human action. They will express and
perform the interests of the dominant class according to a given mode ofproduction and to a
specific mode of development. They will express and implement the power relationships of
the state in a historically defined society. They will be realized and shaped by the progress of
gender domination and by state-enforced family life. At the same time, spatial forms will be
earmarked by the resistance from exploited classes, from oppressed subjects, and from
dominated women. And the work of such a contradictory historical process on the space will
be accomplished on an already inherited spatial form, the product of former history and the
support of new interests , projects , protests, and dreams. Finally, from time to time , social
movements will arise to challenge the meanings of spatial structure and therefore attempt new
functions and new forms. (Castells, 1983:4)
Understanding the development of particular spaces such as gated communities requires the
unpacking and analysis of suburban and urban space. Chapter 2 does just that by using the
notions of space and spatiality as background to understand how space is not devoid of
political and social meaning. A discussion of the anthropology of space and place is engaged
in so as to establish a working analytical vocabulary and address issues relating to the
importance of theorizing the city in spatial terms, and, the role of space in forging identities.
Furthermore, by discussing issues of space as unstable and moving, space as not transparent,
the importance of location and locatedness, and, spatiality as an incomplete process of
identity formation (Pile & Keith, 1997), this chapter seeks to understand space and its
manifestations in the suburban area of northern Durban.
Indeed, while anthropologists have traditionally employed the concepts of space and place by
using spatial dimensions of cultural beliefs and practices to exemplify cultural contexts and
provide conceptual frameworks from which to situate their subject communities, they have
increasingly started to examine space and place as revealing entities of their own (Low et al.,
2003). As a result, notions of space and place have become an ardently enquired subject by
geographers, anthropologists and philosophers during the past decade and many have
highlighted the inherent relationship between landscape and meaning (2003) . Cultural
geographers, traditionally concerned with the morphological characteristics of landscapes,
have increasingly turned to the symbolic and cultural meanings invested in them, recognizing
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that "the place is inseparable from the consciousness of those who inhabit it" (Daniels, 1985:
151). Landscapes can be explored as "symbolic fields", as "maps of meaning", as "ways of
seeing", indeed, read as texts, all of which rests on the presumption that social groups actively
produce meanings but do so in ways that can 'pinch' out emancipatory impulses (Thrift,
1989: 151). Some like David Harvey (1990), for instance, suggests that in highly urbanised
Post-Fordist societies, whereby social, political and economic barriers constantly fluctuate in
unpredictable ways, time and space are being re-structured into what he terms as a "time-
space compression" phenomenon. According to Harvey (1990), spaces can no longer be
understood merely in terms of physicality but should be perceived more in terms of cultural
expressions whereby conventional meanings attached to geographical locations can now be
easily overthrown by new technologies and rapid turnovers of goods' f. It is largely due to the
changing realities of the 21st century's post-Fordist societies that have led to the rethinking
and re-conceptualising of culture in spatialized ways. Michael Watts (1992) identifies four
broad areas of spatial/geographical inspection; the social production of space, the new
regionalism, locality, globality, and modernity, and landscapes as ways of seeing or maps of
meaning. In discussing the society-space question, geographers geared towards a Marxist
tendency have attempted to analyse the inner dynamics of capitalism with uneven
development and spatial differentiation, what Soja (1985: 176) calls the "encompassing
process" of the social production of space. However, as Watts (1992) suggests, David Harvey
is probably the one geographer who has been able to outline the theoretical linkages between
space and capitalism with near-perfect precision and is worth quoting at length:
"Capitalism also "encounters barriers with its own nature," which force it to produce new
forms ofgeographical differentiation. The different forms ofgeographical mobility (e.g.
capital, labour power ...) .. .interact in the context of accumulation and so build, fragment and
carve out of spatial configurations in the distribution of productive forces similar to
differentiation in social relations, institutional arrangements and so on. In so doing, capitalism
frequently supports the creation ofnew distinctions in old guises. . . It is important to
recognise, then, that the territorial and regional coherence that. . .is at least partially discernible
12 Flexible production, in other words the flexible version of industrial urbanism, has been investigated from
three paradigmatic realms: technological, organizational, and territorial or spatial. New technologies are seen as
promoting flexibility through computer-processed changes in product lines, just-in-time delivery systems,
reduced inventory costs, and many other labor and fixed cost-saving devices and strategies. Corporate
organizational structures have become more flexible in various ways. Corporate mergers have formed huge
conglomerates with many diverse specializations that, when successful, can be flexibly expanded or closed down
depending on performance, without having negative effects on other units. Much more attention however has
been given to the vertical disintegration of the production process and the extemalization of risk through
subcontracting, outsourcing, more effective control of labor-management relations, and many other forms of
flexible specialization. The accumulating impact of these technological and organizational changes is viewed as
generating new patterns of territorial development, driving the restructuring of the geopolitical economy of city
space, and shaping the formation of the postfordist industrial metropolis (Soja, 2000).
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within capitalism is actively produced rather than passively received as a concession to
"nature" or history. The upshot is that the development of the space economy of capitalism is
beset by counterposed and contradictory tendencies. On the one hand spatial barriers and
regional distinctions must be broken down. Yet the means to achieve that end entail the
production ofnew geographical differentiations which form new spatial barriers ..."
(Harvey, 1985: 11).
A particular regime of capitalist accumulation produces a particular landscape whose very
fixity becomes a barrier to be overcome in the next wave of inevitable restructuring triggered
by the relentless, competitive pursuit of profit on a global scale (Watts, 1992). According to
Harvey (1985), periods of re-composition or mutation, which in effect have attempted to
annihilate space with time, involve massive devalorization, what he calls "creative
destruction". Capitalism's periodic mutations are, in this view, forms of "space-time
compression" - a sort of speeding up, a new, faster form of capitalism, in which capitalism
"constructs objective conditions of space and time sufficient to its needs and purposes of
material and social reproduction" (Harvey, 1990: 419). The recurrent, serial production of
new spaces, practices, and patterns is accompanied by, in other words, new experiences of
space and time. To the extent that space and time are constitutive elements of what is broadly
termed modernity, then to the same extent the history of capitalism is the story of multiple
capitalisms and multiple modernities (Soja, 1989). With these arguments in mind, I
investigate how the focus on spatial issues has challenged anthropologists to examine their
own 'modem' urban surroundings instead of studying cultural phenomena in faraway and
isolated places (Low et al., 2003). The remaining part of this chapter explores the meaning of
space and place in anthropological study as well as provide examples of spatial theorizing,
especially as regards to urban space.
Marcuse & van Kempen (2000) suggest that within developing and developed cities alike, co-
exist various 'cities' in a quartered fashion; the luxury city of the inherited class with erected
walls, the city of the gentry, the suburban city of the middle-classes, the resident city of the
working class (blue and white collar) and the abandoned city of the migrants and excluded
poor, all of which are differentiated along levels ofdevelopment, income classes, racial zones,
and socio-political importance. An example of this division is the Group Areas Act passed in
South Africa during the 1960s and having the purposeful aim of confining racial groups into
specific regions in an attempt to avoid and reduce any possibility of social interaction between
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different races 13• In this way, the economic and political power of the Afrikaner white ruling
minority could be upheld without any interference (Zegeye et al., 2003). In addition to this,
Hannigan (1998) describes the post-modern 'fantasy city' to allude to the tremendous
commercialisation of leisure and the metropolis itself in selective middle-class
'eatertainment', 'shopertainment, and 'edutainment' , in centres of wealth and conspicuous
consumption, ignoring realities as homelessness, unemployment, social injustice, crime, and
disease (Hannigan 1998: 90). It is therefore no coincidence that the phenomenon of ' sanitised'
and privatised spaces to the full enjoyment of a minority of the world's population is
represented by the epitome of commercialised capitalism, in the form of the twentieth century
'fortified shopping mall' , which is more often than not, located in rich suburban areas. The
hypotheses of Harvey (1990), Marcuse & van Kempen (2000), Hannigan (1998) and many
others, aptly summarise the opinion that cities have and are still becoming increasingly
polarized internally with public space privatised as the " ...triumph of market over place, as
brand identity and protection is extended from manufactured goods to the spaces of the city"
(Hannigan 1998: 194). Social polarization, as explained by Hannigan (1998), is not only the
result of spatial divisions, but also due to economic transformations of cities as globalisation
takes over and the gap between poor and rich gets bigger, while the middle class is slowly
eroded. This is captured more succinctly relating to residential divisions in:
"Boundaries between divisions, reflected in social or physical walls among them, are
increasing. The result is a pattern of separate clusters of residential space, creating protective
citadels and enclaves on the one side and constraining ghettos on the other, in a hierarchical
relationship to each other . The market produces and reproduces these divisions, but the state
is deeply involved in their creation and perpetuation. The state can also ameliorate them, and
will tend to do so under specific conditions." (Marcuse & van Kempen 2000: 3).
13 The Group Areas Act (no. 41 of 1950), adopted on 7 July, determined and controlled the space in which each
population group - as defined by the Population Registration Act - was to be relocated and live, and reinforced
the effects of the Amended Immorality Act. This law, which guaranteed the physical separation of Blacks,
Coloureds and Whites by confming each groups to different geographic areas, was meant, as its subtitle
indicates, to 'provide the establishment of group areas, for the control of the acquisition of immovable property
and the occupation of land and premises, and for matters incidental thereto.
On the one hand is the fear of the loss of economic and political power and the fear of seeing their race disappear
through miscegenation. One the other hand, there seems to be the fear of the unknown. It is the fear of the
'Other' which underlies the willingness to live in separate spheres. Thus, through locking up each group in a
geographically confmes area, Whites in general, and Afrikaners in particular, hoped to live hermetically and
become impenetrable to invasion by other groups. The Group Areas Act locked and bolted South African society
in such a tangible and objective manner that communication between individuals from different groups became
almost impossible (Ebr-Vally, 2001).
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Some conceptual structures accounting for spatial dimensions
Amongst the various spatial dimensions that Low et al. (2003) identify, contested spaces and
trans-national spaces are the most relevant to my research. The study of contested spaces
addresses social conflicts that are focussed on particular sites. 'Contested spaces' is defined as
"geographic locations where conflicts in the form of opposition, confrontation, subversion,
and/or resistance engage actors whose social positions are defined by differential control of
resources and access to power", such as is the case in the dialectic of rich and poor (Low et al.
2003). Whereas those meanings mainly centre on the meanings invested in particular sites, or
derive from their interpretation, they disclose broader social struggles over profoundly held
collective myths (McDonough, 1992). Low and others (2003) argue that spaces are contested
precisely because they concretise the fundamental and persistent ideological and social
frameworks that structure practice, a practice that in turn informs peoples ' 'habitus'. The
urban milieu provides many opportunities for spatial contests due to their complex structures
and differentiated social entities that collude and compete for control over material and
symbolic resources. Macro level analyses of such spaces have centred on scuffles to control
the outcomes of urban redevelopment schemes related to housing and neighbourhood
(Castells, 1983) and 'urban sacred space' (Harvey 1985) where local residents organize
themselves to oppose the dominant classes and political elite. These investigations of class-
based struggles emphasize how space is constitutive of power, and how people can resist and
object against state-imposed regimes. The study of contested spaces allow me to analyse the
power dynamics involved in the choice to move to richer, 'sanitised' neighbourhoods , away
from what Davis (1992) calls downtown, to more uptown urban markets in North Durban.
The second spatial trope relevant to my study is 'trans-national spaces ' which comprises of
global, transnational, and translocal spatial transformations produced by the economy of late
capitalism, focusing on people on the move. In discussing these three perspectives to
transnational spaces, and their utility in formulating an anthropological approach, Low et al.
(2003) highlight the movement of peoples rather than the flow of capital and commodities .
Global spaces is conceived as the flow of goods, services and people, as well as capital,
technology, and ideas, across national borders and geographic areas, resulting in not only the
compression of space, but also its deterritorialization. Anthropologists have challenged the
view of globalisation as taking over every part of society, by studying 'the local' and
examining the articulations of the global and the local (Low 1999; Ong, 1999). Fran Rothstein
& Michael Blim (1991) and others for instance, investigate how global industrialization
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reforms the everyday lives and localities of factory workers, and how new workers rebuild
meaning and community in the context of their transformed lives. Studies of transnational
spaces, on the other hand, focus on the movement across spaces and formations of new
relationships between nation-states and capital. While some people consider borders as
increasingly potential sites of crossing, others see them as militarised sites of "immobility and
surveillance, controlling and restricting movements of individuals by race, gender, and class"
(Elder, 1998). These migration studies challenge conventional notions ofborders , boundaries,
nations, and community by redefining the relationship of the global, transnational, and the
local. As a result, they reformulate social and political space, overthrowing traditional
concepts of centre and edge, as well as cultural core and difference at the margins, to create
fluid, transnational space produced by 'ordinary' people (Marston, 1990). On the other hand,
the studies of translocal spaces deal with the way anthropologists write about their subjects as
located in 'one place' and speaking with 'one voice'. The lack of multi-vocality and multi-
locality very often present in ethnographical research leads to a number of problems: an
incapacity to deal with people who live on the borderlands and account for cultural difference
within a locality; an assumption that countries embody their own unique culture and society;
and a lack of understanding ofhybridity in post-coloniality (Gupta & Ferguson 1992). All of
these three perspectives , the global, the transnational and the translocal, offer a key approach
to spatiality and the production of space.
Particular representations emerge from specific material spatial practices and from certain
forms of domination and control of space, yet they can become material forces in their own
right (Watts, 1992). These dimensions of the material (flows, patterns , movement),
presentational (spatial signs, codes and maps), and the imaginary dimensions of space can be,
as it were refined along certain axes of spatiality: access/distanciation, appropriation/use,
domination/control, and social production (Watts, 1992). The strongest geographical suit has
been in material spatial practices, what Peet & Thrift (1989) have called the political economy
approach in human geography, documenting the uneven development of capitalism, the social
production of spaces and regions, the changing spatial divisions of labour, and the means by
which spaces, for example cities, are appropriated (e.g. gentrification), controlled, and
regulated (Watts, 1992). Another dimension oflocality that takes off from the reality of wider
economic, cultural, and political processes being worldwide in scope, and the individual being
automatically enmeshed in global webs in historically unprecedented ways is the "critical
cosmopolitarianism" as Paul Rabinow (1986: 258) calls it, that speaks to the lack of fit
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between the local and the global. Communities become locations in which trans-national
circuits of capital , labour, and information intersect with one another and with local ways of
life, obscuring identities and imploding the Third World into an experience in which "the
space of flows . .. supersedes the space ofplaces" (Henderson & Castells, 1987: 7).
Space is not static, nor is time spaceless (Keith & Pile, 1993). It is crucial to recognize space
and conceptualise it as constructed out of interrelations , as the concurrent coexistence of
social interrelation at all spatial scales, from the most local level to the most global. In human
geography, the recognition that the spatial is socially constituted and that the social is
necessarily spatially constituted too. One the one hand, all social (and indeed physical)
phenomena/activities/relations have a spatial form and a relative spatial location: the relations
that bind communities, whether they be 'local' societies or worldwide organizations; the
relations within an industrial corporation. The spatial spread of social relations can be closely
local or widely global, or anything"in between. Their spatial extent and form also change over
time. But, whatever way it is, there is no escaping the fact that the social is inescapably also
spatial. My intention here is that this social aspect of space be used to define the spatial. Thus,
the spatial is socially constituted. 'Space' is created out of the vast intricacies, the incredible
complexities, of the interlocking and the non-interlocking, and the networks of relations at
every scale from local to global. What makes a particular view of these social relations
specifically spatial is their simultaneity. It is a simultaneity, also, which has extension and
configuration (Keith & Pile, 1993).
As the above arguments suggest, in assessing their interaction for any particular period, or in
regard to any particular problem of theory or method, the nature of particular places is an
important and under-appreciated factor. The central fact here is that what anthropologists find,
in this or that place, far from being independent data for the construction and verification of
theory, is in fact a very complicated compound of local realities. In the cases of anthropology
and history, given their idiographic, qualitative, and narrative orientations, place is not just a
trivial contingency associated with data gathering, but a vital dimension of the subject matter
of the disciplines (Appadurai , 1986). There is also the question of identity, what it means ,
how we approach it. Watts (1992) argues that a significant weakness of the postmodernism
debate in geography is the relatively little consideration given to how people define
themselves, how identities are stitched together to act in the new spaces of post-Fordist
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economy. Amidst the debris of modernist fragmentation and disengagement, how can identity
be constructed at all, especially in the context ofmultiple identities?
Urban space and the city
Low (1996) argues that the cultural meaning of urban space reflects an attempt to understand
"the meaning of urban spaces through the knowledge of the people who live within them".
Studies of the relationship between space, culture and the city are characterized by the search
for the underlying social and cultural values and power politics that give form and meaning to
the cityscape and the built urban environment. Low (1996) argues that theorizing the city is an
integral part of understanding the changing post-industrial, advanced capitalist, post-modem
movement in which we live. The city, being a site of everyday practice, provides ''valuable
insights into the linkages of macro processes with the texture and fabric of human experience.
The city is not the only place where these linkages can be studied, but the intensification of
these processes - as well as their human outcomes - occurs and can be understood best in
cities" (Low, 1996).
In Imagining and Theorizing the City, Low (1996) gives us some conceptual metaphors and
images with which to conceptualise the various types of cities that have been and are
emerging. These include the divided city and the fortress city. The divided city is described as
evoking hidden barriers of race and class encoded in metaphors of uptown and downtown,
upscale and ghetto. Explorations of the economic, social, and political consequences of
racism include the concept of 'white public space' to analyse how 'white' institutions control
even the production of 'blackness' and how race, class and gender relations through the
organization of capitalism, which she defines as a materially based and state-reinforced social
and cultural construction. In other words Low (1996) explains the divided city through the
unequal distribution of 'cultural capital' 14; the symbolic repertory whose meanings
individuals learn and use as members of particular social networks - and 'social capital' ; the
relations of reciprocity between individuals and groups. The fortress city, on the other hand, is
what Davis's (1992) calls the militarization of the public space. The fortress city is drawn
from its radical history of the development of Los Angeles, in which Davis (1992) traces the
control of media, seizure of land, busting of unions, rigging of water rights, and exclusion of
minorities from political participation, all of which has resulted in the destruction of public
14 Cultural and social capital are defmed by physical vectors such as urban space and by collective constructions
such as social class, race, and gender, and thus are toponomical, dependent on physical and social location (ref) .
18
space. The fortress city refers to not only the uneven distribution of city space, but also to the
privatisation of certain spaces for the purpose of certain social groups within society. These
two conceptual metaphors allow me to compare and contrast the gated community within the
larger metropolitan area ofDurban.
Furthermore, Low's (1996) two metaphors of imagining cities allows us to gam a
comprehensive understanding of the complexity of the cities and their accompanying social,
cultural and economic baggage. It has already been established that city space is not devoid of
the social. In the remaining section, I discuss city space in terms of economic capital in a
post-Fordist society in an attempt to provide a clear framework with which to understand the
geography of our metropolis in crisis. Harvey (1978) describes the city as an economic hub in
which:
Capital represents itself in the form of physical landscape created in its own image, created as
use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital. The geographical landscape
which results is the crowning glory ofpast capitalist development. But at the same time it
expresses the power of dead labour over living labour and as such it imprisons and inhibits the
accumulation process within a set ofphysical constraints.... Capitalist development has
therefore to negotiate a knife-edge path between preserving the exchange values ofpast
capitalist investments in the built environment and destroying the value of their investments
in order to open up fresh room for accumulation. Under capitalism, there is then a perpetual
struggle in which capital builds a physical landscape appropriate to its own condition at a
particular moment in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the course of crises, at a
subsequent point in time. The temporal and geographical ebb and flow of investment in the
built environment can be understood only in terms of such a process. (Harvey, 1978: 124)
In response to Harvey's critique, it is argued by Soja (2000) that these cultural and
consumption issues and problems are not only very important, but that they can also be better
comprehended and reconceptualized through a thorough rethinking of the dynamics of social
production and divisions of labour, especially in relation to the dramatic industrial
restructuring that occurred in the last third of the 20th century. Soja (2000) particularly argues
that the industrial restructuring process is having the effect of using up out and polarizing
urban labour markets, the latter being one of the primary expressions of the social divisions of
labour in city space. The previous middle sector of the labour market as well as the middle
class more generally are now being squeezed, with a select few rising above economically
into managerial positions, while much larger numbers, mostly unionised blue-collar workers,
are feeling the effects of severe reductions of household income and edging toward what has
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recently come to be called the welfare-dependent urban underclass'", Needless to say, the
deconstruction and reconstitution of Fordism has had a significant disciplining effect on all
three components of the Fordist social contract. Big Business, Big Government and Big
Labour have all been drastically "downsized" to become, in Bennett Harrison's pungent
phrase, increasingly "lean and mean" . As Harrison (1994, rev.edn. 1997) argues, this has
allowed the Fordist trio to survive in the Age of Flexibility but at an enormous economic,
political, and social cost to the general population. It is also becoming clear that the new post-
fordist economies and geographies, rather than relieving these costs, are compounding them
in what increasingly appears to be a vicious cycle of social polarization and widening
economic inequalities.
The Post Metropolis
What Soja (2000) calls the post metropolis is represented primarily in terms of its
reconfigured empirical geography, the new 'patternings' and specificities or urban form,
function, and behaviour that have emerged with the advent of globalisation and post Fordist
economic restructuring. The focus shifts to the synchronized and interdependent reshaping of
the urban social order and the new patterning of social stratification and socio-economic
inequality. What is emphasized here are the geographical outcomes of the new urbanization
process and their concrete effects on everyday life, the planning and design of the built
environment, as well as the uneven patterning of 'intra-urban' economic growth and
development (Soja, 2000).
In most of the literature of urban historians, the notion of suburbia was viewed primarily as a
product of intentional residential decentralization, primarily of a wealthy elite but soon
followed, closer to the city centre, by workings-class inner suburbs and further out by mostly
white middle-class "pioneers" pushing ever outward the suburban "frontier". This hunt for
'better' housing, supported by improved public transport facilities and backed by ambitious
real estate developers, was seen as the major driving factor behind suburbanization. As a
result, a sprawling landscape of detached and privately owned homes and a culturally
homogenous and "consumerist" suburbia where most jobs remained outside the local milieu
developed (Soja, 2000). One of the main features of this new trend was a simulacrum of the
15 Charting the social and spatial impact on industrial restructuring on urban labor markets and their
segmentation by gender, race, and ethnicity, as well as occupation and location has been a major research focus
for the industrial urbanists (Soja, 2000).
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old dichotomy of city and countryside, now reproduced in the modern metropolis around the
division between urban and suburban landscapes or worlds, each with their distinctive "ways
of life", very much characterised by gated community developments located in wealthy
peripheral suburban areas.
Urban Apartheid
Following this theoretical framework of the city discourse, it is important to consider the
urban situation during the pre and post Apartheid eras by discussing the spatial geography of
apartheid and analysing the historical nature and physical characteristics of the Apartheid city.
Spatial segregation can be traced back to the 19th century and the strictures that colonial
society imposed upon southern Africa's urban areas. Case studies indicate that many South
African suburbs consisted of heterogeneous racial groups to a much larger degree than is
generally acknowledged by Apartheid historians, and despite the fact that black and white
were uneasy neighbours, they were generally known to have shared urban facilities with
relative success (Frescura, 2001). A major change in this state of affairs happened however in
1923 when the Union Parliament passed the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, which laid down the
principles of racial segregation and reinforced the myth that the African population had no
permanent rights in the towns. Despite the Act's propositions, the now 'white' suburbs
remained more or less integrated to varying degrees until 1948 when the Nationalist Party
came to power. From then on, the process of separating various racial communities was put
into practice by placing upon it an ideological traction, and was given necessary importance
by a variety of inter-linking residential, squatting, labour and security legislation (Frescura,
2001). Although, the dialectic under which Apartheid principles were based has changed over
the years, its concrete effect upon the black community has led to the dispossession of their
homes and land, often with no reparation. They have also been denied access to markets,
infrastructure, and civic amenities, leading to their impoverishment and increased economic
hardship.
While many other authors have emphasized capital accumulation, a docile workforce, white
agitation or just plain racism, it has been suggested that the organization of urban space into
racially segregated living areas was central to the persistence of the racial state and indeed, ,
that it was one of the key technologies/strategies which facilitated the effective
implementation of state power in South Africa's urban areas (Robinson, 1996). Urban
21
apartheid16, then, was a particular historical form of a spatial technology of power, which
emerged in the arena of state intervention in the city (1996). Without a gathering of the
racially defined Black African population into spatially contained areas and the evolution of
specific methods of administration and governance in these areas, the implementation of
various racial policies would have been at the mercy of the racial and physical 'chaos' of the
early 20th century city. The power of apartheid and the setting apart of racial groups, was
therefore much more than simply an expression of a political order, the spaces of apartheid
constituted and sustained that order (Robinson, 1996).
Apartheid city planning was marked by a number of features which, if read in historical
context, could be interpreted as part of a segregation residential policy. Franco Frescura,
(2001) discusses some of the characteristics of this segregation. He illustrates how buffer
zones were used to create and reinforce racial segregation, the land was owned by the white
controlled municipalities and consequently these areas were often developed as industrial
townships. Thus, although businesses in these areas employed workers from the nearby black
suburbs, their rates and taxes were paid to the white municipality under whose control they
fell (2001). Another spatial strategy included extended city planning whereby, black
residential suburbs were invariably removed from the Central Business District (CBD), an
obvious link with the colonial 'Segregated City'. Extended road links were also one of the
most obvious features of the Apartheid City with its wide spread residential suburbs linked by
relatively long travel links. An integrated city on the other hand, would probably have
developed along more compact lines. Finally, radical street planning by city architects was
used in many black towns to facilitate military operationswithin their other streets. This dated
back to the time when Verwoerd was Minister of Natives Affairs. The planning of radical
roadways and the provision oflimited access to an area was not the invention ofthe architects
of apartheid, but was a salient feature of mine compounds planning (2001). Urban racial
segregation has created blatantly divided landscapes with sprawling, infrastructurally poor
black townships disconnected from the high-rise commercial city centre and suburban areas.
These different places 'mattered' not only as contrasting contexts for social life but because
16 Apartheid, a universal signifier of political and racial domination, has a specific literal meaning as well,
"apartness". It is a social system founded upon the "setting apart" in space of different race groups. The power of
apartheid was crucially dependent upon this spatiality. Apartheid - setting apart - was itself constitutive of the
power of the South African racial order. But the spatial technology upon which this political order rested was
invented long before the term 'apartheid' became popular - indeed, even before its predecessor, segregation,
emerged as a coherent political platform. And unfortunately , the spatiality of apartheid persists to confound post-
apartheid urban managers in their project of repairing the damages of the past (Robinson, 1996).
22
they also constituted a making of state power. As opposed to most other accounts of urban
segregation, which have focused on racism or economic interest to explain this urban
phenomenon, the reasons for which the state itself chose to intervene in the urban arena in this
way is worth investigating.
All these groups contributed to the construction of a discourse or urban native administration,
which greatly influenced the shaping of the form and content of state interventions in 20th
century South African cities. It is interesting to note that these discourses were not only
outside modernity but also that the tactics and rationalities, which materialized to regulate
urban space in South Africa, were closely in parallel to modernizing strategies throughout the
West. Needless to say, urban segregation had already been established long before (during the
colonialist era)17 it was articulated as part of a relatively coherent ideology of Apartheid
segregation. The general neglect in South African studies on the state's own interests and the
importance of spatiality in power relations has served to conceal the early history of the
location strategy in South Africa (Robinson, 1996). By focusing on the country's economic
demands in describing the history of urban segregation, the continuity of purpose (effective
government and political domination) in the location strategy has been understated18.
Therefore, apartheid did not become merely the means of plundering the wealth of the
country, and of placing it in white Afrikaner hands. It was also a social system, which ensured
that, once racism has abated, class would replace race as the primary means of social
17 Whereas the formal and legal political ideology of segregation only materialised after the turn of the century,
it was only in the l880s that white racist agitation over African living conditions has emerged in towns . The
location strategy was first implemented in the l830s in rural areas and the late l840s in urban areas in the eastern
Cape. The particular theoretical and empirical lenses they have adopted have inevitably, influenced the search by
historians for the 'origins' of segregation in South Africa .
18 Robinson (1996) has identified 3 phases in the evolution of state interventions in the urban arena. The first, he
suggests, was primarily associated with public health and disease control, and was embodied in the Public Health
Act (No. 36 of 1919) and the Slums Act (No. 53 of 1934). Under these provisions, housing could be declared
'unfit for human habitation' and the occupants removed or the buildings demolished. A second phase of
legislation was more directly concerned with achieving control over African people living in towns . One of the
main problems faced by the state in enforcing both this and the public health legislation was the lack of available
alternative accommodation for those whom they wished to remove from certain areas. This problem was not
successfully resolved until the 1950s, although the state persisted in its efforts to improve its capacity to
implement these policies . It was agreed that African settlement in urban areas should be limited in order both to
secure better control and to effects some state regulation of the distribution of the labor supply. The third phase
of urban intervention - the apartheid state - was in many respects a consolidation and streamlining of previous
urban policies, and it saw the apartheid government fmding solutions to the severe constraints on urban
intervention and housing provision that has disabled the pre-1948 state. Legislation requiring African residence
in locations could then be fully enforced for the first time. However, segregated housing for defmed 'coloured'
and 'white' people was also to be legally required under the Group Areas Act. There had been forerunners to this
Act, both legislative and customary. Under the Housing Act, for example, fmds and planning approval were only
provided for segregated housing schemes; racially restrictive clauses were frequently inserted into title deeds of
private housing developments and the Pegging Act in Natal had been designed to resolve Indian-White
competition for residential and commercial in favour of whites (Robinson, 1996).
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demarcation. Apartheid therefore set out to create in perpetuity a proletariat, which, by no
coincidence was also black (1996). It turns out that this is exactly what happened.
Until the Soweto unrest of 1976, and the ensuring gradual loosening of apartheid laws and
ordinances , security measures to protect private houses from intruders and, in particular, gated
communities, were largely unknown in the predominantly European-style cities of South
Africa. Instead of building walls or fences aimed at separating mini-communities from the
outside world, apartheid policies were designed to segregate ethnically defined parts of the
population on a large scale in order to contain generally the so-called ' swaart gevaar' (The
Black danger) (Bahr & Jurgens, 1993), which had been a constant concern of the white
population. During the 1980s, and particularly after the abolition of the Group Areas Act in
the early 1990s, an obvious shift in population structure took place (Jurgens , 1991). This
development took place on a larger scale in the inner cities. Non-whites (Africans, Indians,
Colored) moved into residential areas that had been originally predominantly occupied by
whites. At first, this urban move was done in an illegal way (the development of so-called
'grey areas') (Tomaselli & Tomaselli, 1998), although the police often tacitly chose to ignore
it. However, in 1991 legal restrictions were lifted (Jurgens, 1991) and the new dwellers
moved into vacant apartments in the previously 'white' sector of real estate into apartments,
which they would never have received in the townships. In some areas, the long-term result
was a distinct change in atmosphere from the original European one towards a more African
urban environment.
With this new urban development, the perception of a society in transition as well as the very
real fear of crime and falling real estate prices increased, particularly among the white
population. Whites not only found themselves confronted with an increasing number of
squatters, both in the outskirts of the cities and in municipal parks but also had to deal with
the new race groups that were 'invading' their properties . This infiltration created much more
than just an image problem. Needless to say, the politically motivated unrest of the black
population against the apartheid system in the mid-1980s, and the state's implicit acceptance
of violations of apartheid rules which had begun in the late 1970s had triggered a 'paranoia'
of personal insecurity and political uncertainty as well as the development of various
construction measures designed to protect citizens in the predominantly white cities (Jurgens ,
1991). From the mid-1980s, the security business developed into the fastest growing sector of
the South African economy. In the mid-1990s, up to 150 000 people worked in this field
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(CSIR, 2000). Today, South Africa is amongst the few countries, which has more private
security personnel than the state's police (2000).
In 1991, when all apartheid laws were finally abolished, mobility control over non-whites
stopped. However, the obvious social contrast between 'rich' white residents and 'poor' black
street merchants, beggars, and taxi drivers became a daily sight in residential areas that had
originally been declared as exclusively 'white' . After the democratisation of South African
society, the predominantly white police force could no longer concentrate on the protection of
these residential areas in their daily routine. This in turn led both to a sharp increase in crime
in general and to its even more distribution among formerly black and white residential areas
(Mills 1991: 92). In a survey conducted in 1998 on crime rates, it was indicated that 62% of
1266 interviewed persons from all population groups in Johannesburg stated that either they
personally, or family members, had become crime victims between 1993 and 1997;
nationwide, the figure was 44%. Some 28% suffered more than one incident (Statistics SA,
1998: 41). Although white persons are victims of serious crime less often than are non-whites,
on a nationwide basis they are almost twice as often victims of property offences as are
people from the middle-income stratum and this figure rises with increase in annual
household income (1998).
This fear of crime has led the population to react defensively by hiring 'paid-for protection'
(armed response) or by 'mob justice' in order to compensate for the perceived inactivity of
the police force and the penal system (CSIR 2000). It has been said that fear of crime has
become an everyday concern in South African society. 'Rich' people in particular react to this
with 'target hardening ' - "physical strengthening of building facades or boundary walls to
reduce the attractiveness or vulnerability of potential targets" (2000: 6). The growing
expansion for security-enforced neighbourhoods was further enhanced after the first
democratic elections of 1994 (Roberts, 1996). Although a new stable system of government
was established, one which allayed fears for the future among the white population, those who
could afford it preferred to take matters in their own hands and move to communities which
were enclosed and had restricted access, using the crime factor as official pretext. Crime
drove the market, analysts concluded (Cohen, 1997). Therefore people from upper classes as
well as people from the white and the aspiring new black middle class fuelled the demand for
walled communities.
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Gating in South Africa
The result of this spatial segregation has left the country riddled with huge social, economic
and environmental disparities amongst the various race groups existing in South Africa. As a
consequence, the present government faces two particular challenges regarding those
inequalities: to upgrade existing underdeveloped areas through the provision of sufficient
infrastructure and services and to integrate these areas with the rest of the city. This
integration might also indirectly contribute to crime prevention19 as the government
speculates in a number of crime prevention strategies. Meanwhile, many citizens are
responding in their own way in disregard to the government's intentions of creating a more
integrated society. High levels of crime'? and the fear of crime, are giving rise to major
changes in the urban landscape, such as defensive architecture and urbanism. The emergence
of gated communities is transforming the face of South African cities (Landman, 2000).
Spatial responses to crime ion Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban, have varied from
interventions to buildings (burglar bars, security gates, steel shutters etc.) and physical
protection of properties and street blocks (fencing, alley-gating, etc.), to the closing-off of
entire neighbourhoods (gated communities) (Landman, 2000). The implication of this
deliberate and overt spatial segregation raises the question of whether these interventions
should be viewed from a single perspective or whether they call for a multi-dimensional
interpretation, both in terms of spatial manifestation and institutional responses.
Once Apartheid crumbled, and spatial barriers were removed, various race groups started
moving out of their previous residential areas. For instance, a large proportion of blacks
started to move to the inner cities where jobs were more available (Frescura, 2001). However,
being from lower economic groups, they often resorted to live in cheap housing, known as
townships, offered by the government such as Chesterville, informal settlements and squatter
camps. This infiltration in tum led to a transformation in the urban landscape of the cities.
Blacks seeking jobs now populated certain areas in central Durban, such as West Street,
19 Dramatic political transition is often followed by social , economic and spatial transition as well. Comparisons
of the links between political transitions and the growth of crime have indicated remarkable links between
political transition, rising crime levels , and socio-economic and spatial changes (Shaw 1997; 2000) . South Africa
faces huge challenges in terms of poverty, unemployment and high crime levels. It is estimated that more than
50% of the population lives below the poverty line and that more than 30% of the population is unemployed.
Overall crime levels increased by almost 5% between 1997-1998 , 7% .in 1998-1999, and 7.6% in 1999-2000
(Shonteich 2002) .
20 Crime is an everyday reality in South Africa and a major concern of the majority of the South African.
Overall crime levels increased by almost 5% between 1997-1998 , 7% in 1998-1999 and 7.6% in 1999-2000
(Shonteich 2002) . Many people are reaching out to fmd additional ways to prevent crime . One such a response is
gating communities.
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which had been mostly frequented by Whites and Indians during Apartheid. As a result, the
levels of crime in the CBD increased for many reasons ranging from poverty, invasion of
gangs, to unemployment. This sudden change was perceived as a threat to Whites and
Indians, and those who could afford it, chose to move out from the in the inner cities and
settle in suburban areas (Ebr-Vally, 2001). Private developers took the opportunity and did
not hesitate to supply to demand for safer and homogenous residential areas. As a result, the
most affluent families resorted to move into gated condominiums in areas like Umhlanga, La
Mercy, and La Lucia, all located in northern Durban. Needless to say, these gated
condominiums and complexes had specific target markets and demographics (2001).
The Gated Community
Most of the works on gated communities'" have been in the United States and about the
United States. Blakely & Snyder (1997) have systematically analysed the motives for this
type of planning and they distinguish various types of communities including lifestyle
communities, which attract prospective residents with a variety of leisure activities and other
aspects of personal comfort; prestige communities, which are characterized by the elitist
social standing and the corresponding public image of their inhabitants; and security-zone
communities whose inhabitants, because of either fear or paranoia of the outside world, base
their decision to live there on the various security measuresr', Gated communitiesr' are
essentially residential areas with restricted access such that normally public spaces have been
21 Neighborhoods or precincts that are fortressed from the rest of the city through walls , gates and high
technology surveillance systems, yet sustained through guarded, dedicated highway gates, customized water and
energy connections, and telecommunications grids, that selectively connect them to the wider urban constellation
and the universe beyond (Garham & Marvin 2001: 4). This is contnbuting to a condition that Garham & Marvin
(2001) refer to as Splintering Urbanism. Across the world, residential neighborhoods, commercial centers, retail
spaces , entertainment districts and office parks are fortified and privatized in this way as a result of actions of
private business , large corporations and wealthier citizens and sometimes those of local authorities as well
(Marcuse 2001; Blakely & Snyder 1997). The result is that many residents are now living in "fortress cities",
brutally divided into ' fortified cells ' of 'affluence and places of terror' (Davis 1995).
22 Gated communities take the idea of crime prevention through environmental design to its extreme, by
applying the principles of territoriality, defensible space , access control and image. In the case of enclosed
neighborhoods, existing neighborhoods are closed-off through booms and gates across roads . Many are fenced
off or walled off as well , with a limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at these points
in some cases. The emphasis is on security. In fact, applications for neighborhood enclosures can only be
approved for security reasons . The roads within these neighborhoods were previously, or still is public property
and in many cases, the local council is still responsible for public services to the community within (Landman,
2003).
23 An important aspect in the functioning of security villages is their internal organization. For instance, in the
gated community I focus on, known as Umhlanga Halls, the owners of property within the compound are
obliged to abide by conduct rules , as are their tenants. In Umhlanga Halls , the rules prohibit behaviour and
illegal modifications to the buildings. Trustees and a chairman serve as representatives and spokespersons of the
community. There is also a homeowners association. These people are obliged to make their decis ion balancing
the private interests of individuals and the interest of the community as a whole .
27
privatised and where internal access is controlled by physical barriers: walled or fenced
perimeters and gated or guarded entrances (Blakely & Snyder, 1997). Gated communities are
more than just apartment or condominium buildings with a doorman controlling access to the
lobby, instead they "preclude public access to roads, sidewalks, parks, open space,
playgrounds - all resources that in earlier days would have been open and accessible to all
citizens of a locality" (Blakely & Snyder 1997: 62).
It was Marcuse (1995) in particular, with his concept of the quartered city, who pointed out
that there are also other, invisible or symbolic, forms of social segregation. The aspect of
'community' emphasizes the integration of interacting individuals into a social network. As
far as gated communities are concerned, the success of such networks does not necessarily
depend on a mutual emotional understanding between neighbours (Johnston et al., 1994);
rather, it is guaranteed through the 'control' of the neighbourhood by means of codes of
conduct - covenants, conditions and restrictions as well as by organizational structures -
(homeowners' associations). Such are the instruments designed to defend the desired harmony
and stability of secluded private residential areas against the disordered and fragmented
society outside. In essence, although there are many other influences, the increasing trend
towards fortification and privatisation is strongly related to perceptions of fear and insecurity
among urban residents. As such, Ellin (1997) argues that "form follows fear" in the
contemporary city, resulting in people in perceived high risk areas constructing defensive
enclaves of various forms and nature to protect their range of interests. In this sense, the
ability of pay is essential in many cases, which also incorporates a second theme, closely
related to the first, namely that of "form follows finance" (Ellin 1997). In developing and
developed cities, gated communities proliferate. Many of these focuses on residential land use
and reflect responses from citizens to modify their living environments to prevent crime and
reduce the fear of crime. Such tendencies are increasingly visible across the world, including
the USA, Brazil, South Africa, and India etc. (Landman, 2003).
The two mam gated communities that I focus on are known as Umhlanga Halls and
Umhlanga Crest, both located north of the city of Durban. Large walled-in and security-
riddled community living spaces, Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest accommodate the
homes of typically elite and demographically homogenous group. Constructed on land that
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had been previously owned by Tongaat-Hulett24 (a predominantly white company and used
for the plantation of sugar-cane fields, the gated communities in Umhlanga (Mount
Edgecombe, Zimbali Lodge, Umhlanga Manors, Umhlanga Ridge) are not only symbolic sites
of previous racial exploitation, but also epitomize the principles of racial superiority through
their very outward power of repressive force. A general description of Umhlanga Halls and
Umhlanga Crest would include the pretentious aspect of the neighbourhood, the high walls
which, appear as severe concretisations of both the unbending authority of apartheid's power,
the unquestionable presence and prerogatives of its supremacy, and not to mention the
extreme warrants and control. All in all, the two gated communities could be interpreted as
being assemblages of economic power, idealised values, indexical natural elements, with
simulated happy-looking, feel-good houses. This overt simulacrum of the 'perfect' and 'safe'
residence brings us to the issue of what Foucault (1997) calls the heterotopia.
The heterotopia
Foucault's (1997) notion of the heterotopia is a way of conceiving social space, a model, as
Lees (1997) puts it, of contemporary socio-spatiallife. It acts as a spatial frame for analysis,
from which larger commentaries may be drawn about the values, practices , and discourses of
a particular social site. It will be helpful so as to inform the analysis to come, to provide a
brief characterization of this spatial-political concept. Foucault (1997) argues that the
heterotopia posses a precise and well-defined function within society. According to Foucault
(1997), the study of heterotopias leads the analyst to the over-arching schema of political
practices and discourses of the society in which it is localized and makes for a viable
theoretical tool for linking space and power, politics and place; as analytic node through
which one might deduce greater networks of power. Hook & Vrdoljak (2001) make the
distinctions between two major forms of the heterotopia; the heterotopia of deviance are those
places occupied by individuals who exhibit behaviour which deviates from current or average
standards of a society; the asylums, psychiatric clinics, prisons, rest homes, schools for
delinquents, old people's homes etc. and, the heterotopia of crisis is recognized as that
"privileged or forbidden place reserved for the individual or society in a state of upheaval,
difficulty or breakdown with reference to the greater environment in which he lives" (2001:
70).
24 To~gaat-Hulett has been a major company dealing in sugar cane and sugar production. The company owned
and sttl~ owns a large part of north Durban 's land. Together with Moreland Developers , the property arm of
sugar giant Tongaat-Hulett, the company has brought about large economic revenues to the whole area over the
past fifty years.
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As such, the gated community qualifies as heterotopic by virtue of its precise and well-
defined function within society, a functioning which, typically, links it to presiding structures
of power (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). The three main functions of a heterotopy place include:
exclusion, separation and avoidance. In this sense, the heterotopic gated community is not
only about providing security, crime prevention and a new sense of community, but is also
about etching a historical structure of into space. Although at some level these pragmatic
rationales for gated community development would hold, as would such given reasons, in a
superficial sense, in the case of the psychoanalytic symptom, they detract from a more
fundamental function. This inscribing of privilege and power means that the political
prerogatives of exclusion, separation, and avoidance have been effectively institutionalised
and legislated existence in the apartheid era (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).
A further characterizing feature of the heterotopia is that it is directly related to other
spatialities. Although the heterotopia is markedly distinct from the spaces around it, it does
connect and link with other spaces, even if such connections work to enhance effects of
contrast and difference more than anything else. Following Foucault (1997), the role of the
heterotopia is either to create "a space of illusion that exposes real space as still more
illusionary", or, to create a space that is "other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous,
as well-arranged, as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled" (1997: 356). The heterotopia
then, by definition, is a differential space, extremely similar to, but always fundamentally
different from, the places that surround it, a sort of simulacra of an aspired utopia. Given this
quality, it is not surprising that, as Foucault (1997) reiterates, the heterotopia "has the power
of juxtaposing in a single real place different spaces and locations that are incompatible"
(1997: 354).
We have already noted that heterotopias are differential spaces; the fact that they are typically
sites of crisis and deviance only strengthens this differential quality. Indeed, it is from this
difference, their very 'otherness' that stems their ability to offer critical perspectives on other
places. Similarly, the heterotopia is a "place that lies outside all places and yet is localizable"
(Foucault, 1997: 352). One assumes from this that the heterotopia is a place able to transcend
its basic social function and to thereby subversively mirror the typical kinds of 'social
intercourse of a society (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). As both spaces of 'otherness' and highly
specified social function, it would seem that the heterotopia should be able to demonstrate a
certain amount of friction between its normative and extraordinary identities. This would in
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tum precisely illustrate the condition underlying its "ability to represent a point of slippage, or
destabilization, for current socio-political or discursive orders of power" (2001). It is this
factor of the heterotopia that renders the prospects of meaningful forms of resistance and
political action realizable. Hence, in Lees's (1997) terms, the heterotopia is a spatially
discontinuous ground that opens a critical space that provides a real site of heterotopias as
"socially-constiucted counter-sites embodying .. .form[s] of resistance" (1997). In this way
one may understand how the heterotopia stands as Foucault's (1997) theoretical conversion of
the idealized notion of the utopia into pragmatic, ' real-world' terms. However, whereas
utopias are ideal sites with no real place, therefore remaining imaginary and fundamentally
unreal , heterotopias are "real sites" of "effectively enacted utopias" (1997: 24). Heterotopias
are then potentially transformative spaces of society from which meaningful forms of
resistance can be mounted. These are the places capable of a certain kind of social
commentary that may be written into the arrangements and relations of space. Following on
this, Lees's (1997) claims that the practical politics of the heterotopias would not be merely
analogies or figurative comparisons of resistance, as in the case of the imagined space of the
utopia, but would instead constitute real-world interventions within the political fabric of
society, acted upon rather than simply spoken forms of criticism commensurate with realized
and actual field ofpolitical action and power (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).
Given that the heterotopia arises around points of crises (particularly those of living spaces),
the gated community could qualify as a heterotopy, especially considering the fact that much
of the upper-class South Africa perceives the current crime problem as of attaining crisis
proportions (2001). The characteristic of the heterotopia, as a 'spatial answer to a problem' is,
apparently, exactly what provides the gated community with a rationale for its extreme and
highly structured control of space. The gated community could also qualify as heterotopy by
virtue of its speci~cally well-defined function within society characteristically linking it to
presiding structures of power; i.e. the gated community as a place of superbly secured
community domicile, certainly serves a necessary function (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).
Furthermore, the way in which the security park serves a well-defined socio-political
function, in particular, that of housing a homogenous class demographic in a residential
complex where that demographic maintains a large degree of self-governance and autonomy,
is a noticeable function of the gated community. On a similar level, these same social
demographic groupings are those that are increasingly non-participatory in schemes of
national unity, reconstruction and reconciliation. In this connection, the spatial autonomy of
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gated communities contributes largely to removing this elite grouping from a sense of
equitable political responsibility (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001). In more than one ways, the
privatisation of the gated community domain, and the prerogatives it accordingly cedes to its
inhabitants (to exclude undesirables, to protect oneself with force, to choose a removed
geographical location) suggests the extent to which the upper-class has decided that national
(or macro) politics is no longer their prioritised choice through which to pursue their interests.
As Foucault argues (1997), the functioning of the heterotopia is most often than not indicative
of more wide sweeping changes across a social sphere. In this respect , the gated community
serves as a model to how the elite engages with their political concerns in the supposedly
'new' rainbow nation South Africa.
The gated community may certainly be read as utopian in the sense that it is the realised
compromise-formation of utopian ideals. In fact, in many ways, the heterotopia is the closest
permissible version of a homogenous and sequestered mini-society. One should be wary
however of pushing such comparisons too far; gated communities do not always exhibit as
homogenous cultural and demographic make-ups as one might imagine, furthermore, they
seem to bring together far less explicit political objectives and agendas. In this respect it
becomes clear that the gated community is a particularly reactionary variation of the
heterotopia, that is, if by 'heterotopia' one is assuming some kind of progressive politics of
space. In many ways, the gated community is an embodiment of exactly the kinds of spatially
infested power, of exactly the increasingly surveyed, segregated and simulated socio-spatial
order that Foucault (1997), and more progressive heterotopic spaces take as their object of
criticism. Furthermore, the production of heterotopic places follow a global trend in the sense
that post-modem urbanism is closely informed by the creation ofutopic spaces for the benefit
of a global middle-class to upper-class elite who seek to inhabit 'perfect' spaces. The
globalisation process invariably affects and influences the restructuring of various socio-
urban/architectural spaces in local cultures and, as a result, has an underlying impact on




DIASPORIC IDENTITIES, THE UMMAH & GLOBALISATION
Introduction
In trying to unpack the reasons for which South African Muslim Indians adopt a western
culture, while promoting Islamic beliefs of humility and conservativeness through regular
religious practices, this chapter discusses issues of identity in an attempt to understand the
negotiation between Islamic identity, Western influence, diasporic attachments and caste
purity. The theory presented in Chapter 3 tries to lay a theoretical framework from which to
comprehend the choice of South African Indian Muslims to segregate themselves in gated
communities, as well as their need to establish their differential social space through
segregation while maintaining their Islamic values. This chapter uses the discourse of
diaspora as a marker to discuss the various factors informing Indian Muslim identity in
Durban, by tracing the migration history of Indian Muslims to South Africa. Using their
migration history and migration patterns in general, the chapter engages in a discussion on
globalisation and how global processes affect the city and its people at a local level, especially
in the context of the South African political and urban past. Issues that are raised include
Arjun Appadurai's (1990) notion of ethnoscapes and their impacts on the restructuring of
various socio-spatial configurations at the urban level. Stuart Hall's (2000) explanation of
identity and how space informs identity is also used to support the arguments made about
diasporic identities.
Understanding Diasporas
The concept of diaspora is a highly contested issue. According to Safran (1991), diasporas are
'expatriate minority communities' that are dispersed from an original 'centre' to at least two
'peripheral places ' ; that maintain a 'memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland' ;
that 'believe they are not - and perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their host country; that see
the ancestral home as a place of eventual return; that are committed to the maintenance or
restoration of this homeland; and of which the group's consciousness and solidarity are
'importantly defined' by this continuing relationship with the homeland (1991: 83-84). These,
according to Safran (1991), are the main features of diaspora: a history of dispersal,
myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return,
ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity importantly defined by this
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relationship (Clifford, 1994: 304-305) . In other words, a diaspora could be seen as a
transnational network of dispersed political subjects. One important feature of some kinds of
diasporas (Jews, Muslims, Armenians) is that ties of co-responsibility connect them across the
boundaries of empires, political communities or (in a world of nation-states) nations (Clifford,
1994). Diasporas are therefore deterritorialised imagined communities which conceive of
themselves, despite their dispersal, as sharing a collective (very often geographical) past and
common destiny, and hence also a simultaneity in time. One crucial point relating to the
notion of diaspora however is that it is dependent upon the discourse of nationalism. The idea
that nationalism is a pre-condition for the construction of diaspora, given the fact diasporas
tend to take the form of the nation (for example, Palestinians, Armenians , Assyrians) is most
often than not true. In a sense, diaspora could refer to a nation in exile. The boundaries that
the discourse of nationalism draws around a community are that which prevents the
dissolution of that community once it is displaced from its locality. Nationalism constitutes
both nations and diasporas - that is a peoplehood that is territorially concentrated (nation) and
territorially displaced (diaspora) (Clifford, 1994).
The term diaspora may be used in a descriptive manner to refer to an empirical situation in
which settler communities are relocated from their ordinary homes (Sayyid, 2003). While the
term diaspora was originally employed to describe the experience of the Jewish displacement,
Indian and African diasporas have now become templates for the understanding what
constitutes a diaspora. Clifford (1994) outlines that modern diasporas are very often ethnic
minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining
strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin - their
homeland. Consequently, the notion of diaspora rests on three inter-linking co-ordinates:
homeland, displacement and settlement. In other words, a diaspora is constituted when
communities of settlers articulate themselves in terms of displacement from a homeland. The
homeland acts as a point of reference around which the community frames its collective
subjectivities. A diaspora is therefore formed when a group of people are displaced but
continue to narrate their identity in terms of that displacement. For example, the Jewish
diaspora exists because unlike other groups that were deported by various ancient conquerors
(Assyrians, Neo-Babylonians), the Jews managed to maintain their collective identity even
when they were territorially displaced and politically subordinated (Sayyid, 2003). However
Clifford (1994) also puts forward the argument that borderlands are distinct in that they
presuppose a territory defined by a geopolitical line: two sides arbitrarily separated and
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policed, but also joined by legal and illegal practices of crossing and communication.
Diasporas usually presuppose longer distances and separation more like exile. It is worth
holding onto the historical and geographical . specificity of the two paradigms, while
recognizing that the concrete predicaments denoted by the terms border and diaspora bleed
into one another.
Castells (1998) argues that for a variety of reasons we are now living in a world of flows that
relate to diasporic movement. He argues that these flows are unsettling because they disrupt
the continuities that allowed collective identities to be formed, maintained and projected.
Globalisation is one way of summing up the transition to this world of flows since it is a
process that is fundamentally linked to the formation of dislocated communities, populations
that no longer fit within the Westphalian ''vacuum'' . The vacuum is unable to contain not only
due to increased mobility but also because its own walls are becoming blurred and flexible.
Castells (1997) identifies five main processes, which seem to be characteristic of
globalisation. First there is the emergence of a nascent global civil society through not only a
propagation ofNGOs which operate across national state boundaries, but also the beginnings
of an attempt to construct a "consensus" on issues such as human rights, economic
management, gender issues and so forth. As a result, the institutional framework for this
consensus is provided by elements that are not restricted to a particular national space; these
elements often take on roles such as "intellectual and moral leadership", which are more often
than not, being very critical of Westphalian notions of state sovereignty. Second, the
development and increasing integration of the world political economy acts to link disparate
economies. For instance, the formation of supranational state-like structures such as the
European Union (EU) also contributes to the over-taking of the Westphalian paradigm. These
"super state" structures dangerously serve to undermine the relationship between national
forms and sovereignty. Third, there is the rise of cosmopolitan significant international
capitalist nodes and provide the terrain where many of the trends associated with globalisation
can be manifested. These global cities are spaces from which attempts to articulate a global
culture is sited but also to large extent, cut-off from the nation-states in which they are
situated. In many ways, however, they have a distinct identity. Fourth, the generalisation of
the experience ofdistant travel (whether it takes the form of labour migration, the compulsory
movements of refugees or tourism) has led to a situation in which very large numbers of
people are on the move or have moved. In this movement, one can trace the implosion of the
Western colonial empires as well as the imperatives of the world economy. And fifth, there is
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the availability of modem technologies of transport, communication and labour migration
which leads to previously dispersed peoples, once separated from homelands by vast oceans
and political barriers, increasingly finding themselves more at ease to maintain a link with
their original land. Airplanes, telephones, tape cassettes, camcorders, and mobile job markets
reduce distances and facilitate two-way traffic, legal and illegal, between the world's places
(Clifford, 1994)25. It is in the context of these processes of globalisation, that the need to find
a vocabulary to describe political/cultural communities that transcend the limits of the
Westphalian model becomes necessary. One such community is that of the Muslims.
The Muslim Ummah - a case of Muslim diaspora?
Muslims all over the world are linked to what is known as the Muslim Ummah - the Ummah
being the symbolic link to Islam itself and to other Muslims. The Ummah is the community of
Allah (God) for Muslims and transcends boundaries , frontiers, nationalities, citizenship,
linguistic differences and all other forms of cultural, political, economic or social
differences26. Theoretically speaking, there are three main factors that point towards the
formation of a Muslim Ummah. Firstly, there is the assumption or rather assertion of an
explicit Muslim subjectivity. This feature is Islam has pervaded in all Muslim communities
(Rahman, 1979). Secondly, Islam is heavily represented through the presence of immigrant
Muslim communities throughout the developed world. The reason for this fact is two-fold; it
is due partly because of migration that has been attended upon decolonisation, but also due to
the large percentage of Muslim refugees since the 1980s. Thirdly, like most recent migrants ,
Muslims have tended to concentrate in urban areas, the latter that happen to be the nodes of
the new developing planetary networks (Castells, 1997). The resulting effect of these
developments has been to create situations in which Muslims from different traditions
converge around commonalities. In turn, this constant juxtaposing of various Muslim
populations has the effect of producing the conditions for the articulation of a Muslim
Ummah. What is crucial here is that the idea of nationhood in Islam is interpreted by
25 Diasporic subjects are, thus, distinct versions of modem, transactional, intercultural experience. Thus
historicized, diaspora cannot become a master trope or 'figure' for modem, complex, or positional identities
crosscut and displayed by race sex, gender, class and culture (Clifford, 1994).
26 The Muslim makes the conscious decision of turning away from everything that is his or hers and supplanting
it with the memory of Arab Islam. In this way, the holy lands of Islam: Mecca, Medina, (often the whole of
Arabia is regarded as sacred by many Muslims) Jerusalem (known as Al-Quds) and so forth, become the
locations of memory instead of the country of which he or she is a citizen. The sacred language of the Muslim is
Arabic and though he or she may not communicate in Arabic, the Muslim's language is regarded as being
inferior to Arabic. In rejecting their own story, converts become, whether they like it or not, a part of the Arab
story. They then develop fantasies about who and what they are (Ebr.-Vally, 2001).
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highlighting the problem of integration; i.e. how to include various populations within the
boundaries of a nation, while focussing on the problem of their loyalties to an edifice larger
than the nation. In other words, Islamism undermines the logic of the nation and at the same
time it seeks to transcend the logic of the nation. However, on a conceptual level, the notion
of the Ummah is to create a collective, a large united community of believing men and
women, much like the idea of nation, but without the physical boundedness that nationhood
implies. In other words, the Ummah is a way of transcending national state boundaries and
instead linking all Muslims to this symbolic community (Rahman, 1979).
Although Islam can offer a sense of attachment elsewhere, to a different temporality and
vision through the concept of the Ummah as the space outside Islamic geographical space has
a lesser importance for Muslims, the Ummah cannot be regarded and interpreted as
representing a nation (Sayyid, 2003). The main reason for this is that while the nation is at
most an enterprise based on an exclusionary universalism, by its boundedness, the idea of the
Ummah rejects all such Cartesian limits as its universalism and implicit expansionism is
constantly reiterated. Nor is the Muslim Ummah a common marker. In spite of supposedly
pious statements from organizations such as the ICO (Islamic Conference Organization), it
has been argued many times that Muslims do not necessarily trade with each other, nor do
they co-operate with each other about other economic matters. My point here is that the
Ummah cannot be conceptualised as a structure arising out of economic integration. The
unifying feature of the Ummah does not owe itself to global networks of labour and capital
flows, although these flows do exist to a certain extent. These flows are not, however, the
factor that helps in suturing the Muslim Ummah. Nor is the Muslim Ummah a common way
of life or a linguistic community. There have indeed been arguments that the Ummah could be
seen as a collective base around a more or less homogenous elite culture; for instance the
Arabic language very often functioned as the lingua franca of the elite. Despite some
practices, which are common among Muslims (e.g. all Muslim pray towards the direction of
Mecca, and read their prayers in Arabic), it is impossible to conclude that these common
features in Muslims' way of life constitute the Muslim Ummah. In a manner of speaking one
can look at the Ummah as a cause for a Muslim diaspora, as all Muslims around the world are
linked to that Muslim community through the Ummah. However, in the case of the Muslim
experience (which should not be seen as a homogenous experience, unaffected by division
and diversity, but that still forms a unity) the idea of the Ummah being 'the' symbolic
homeland is inadequate. Although it is the case that there are many Muslims living as
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minorities throughout the world, the idea of a diaspora demands both a displaced population
and a physical and therefore geographical homeland - the point from which the displacement
originates. Such a homeland is clearly lacking in the Muslim Ummah case. Moreover,
Muslims do not have a place of redemptive return, in spite of the fact that Mecca is the
direction that all Muslims across the world turn to when they pray. "The Universalist urge
within many Muslim discourses makes it difficult to locate a unitary point of origin, and so
there is no homeland, imagined or otherwise" (Sayyid, 2003). Therefore there is no act of
displacement. For the Muslim Ummah is not only reducible to displaced population groups
but also includes the Muslim population in Muslim countries. It is due to the reasons
mentioned above that the notion of diaspora is an incorrect metaphor for describing the
Muslim Ummah. Thus, while the Ummah is not a diaspora itself as it transcends territoriality,
the Muslim Indian community that came to settle in South Africa is very much a diaspora, as
shall be explained in the following section.
The Muslim Indian diaspora in South Africa.
To understand how South African Indian Muslims use religion to conceptualise their identity,
we have to analyse the Muslim community from a historical point ofview'" , The first wave of
Muslims that came to South Africa was during the late 1800s when Muslim Indonesians
immigrated to Cape Town. Today they are known as the Cape Malays. The second wave of
Muslims was from India during late 1800s and early 1900s, some time after the Indonesians
arrived. On close examination of the entire Indian diaspora, we notice that it falls into two
distinct phases. I call them settler and visitor diasporas. The first category refers to all those
who were forced to migrate on account of slavery or indentured labour, otherwise known as
the 'British Indians'. Most of the Indians that came to work in sugar cane plantations arrived
from Calcutta, Madras and Hyderabad. The second category, which, arrived much later in the
1870s, encompasses the voluntary migrations of businessmen and professionals who came to
27 Identity formation, it is argued throughout this chapter, is a two-way dynamic process in which the presence
of the other is an essential component. Talking about 'Indian ' identity implies also talking about past and present
stereotypes. The specific physical features of Indians make them recognizable as such anywhere in the world.
This stereotyping is necessary for it allows the non- 'Indian' as well as the 'Indian' to display their likes and
dislikes of the other. Within the 'Indian' community differences are articulated to allow sub-groups to identify
their members and to place other 'Indians ' into specific groups. These groups may be based on religious,
linguistic, or geographical criteria. These principles of differentiation were active within the community during
the colonial period and the Apartheid era but, in general, the predominant image of 'Indians' was one of a group
defined through a supra-identity. The advent of democracy in South Africa and the recognition of diversity
became a reason for the 'Indians' to claim their specificity. Though the arguments to recognition are situated
within the realm of religion, the effect is to consolidate the sub-communities as an integral part of South Africa 's
diverse society.
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South Africa in search of fortune. Most of them came from the state of Gujarat in India and
needless to say, the second category had much more economic capital. Among them were
Indian traders from established cities in India wanting to expand their commercial operations
in South Africa. Since the latter paid their own fare to South Africa, they were known as
'passenger Indians' because they had no legal and financial obligations to the South African
state in this regard (Vahed, 2000).
These two very distinct groups may be defined not just by the causes and patterns of their .
migration, and the geographical areas from which they migrated, but also by the historical
period in which the migrations took place. Furthermore, these two diasporas may also be
contrasted by their destinations and class backgrounds, attitude to the mother country,
economic status, language of creative expression, market access, and so on. As Mishra (1996)
puts it:
'This narrative of diasporic movement is, however, not continuous or seamless as there is a
radical break between the older diasporas of classic capitalism and the mid- to late twentieth-
century diasporas of advanced capital to the metropolitan centres of the Empire, the New
World and the former settler colonies." He calls these two "interlinked, but historically
separated diasporas" as the "old ('exclusive') and the new ('border')" diasporas
(Mishra, 1996: 422).
I argue that these two diasporas produce two different kinds of migrant communities in the
host country. In the case of the older diaspora (those of indenture ancestry), there has been a
significant break with the motherland (India). This break, far from being voluntary, but rather
enforced by the distances between India and the migrant settlement, the much slower modes
of travel of the time, and, above all, the lack of economic means to make frequent journeys,
made the older diaspora invariably lose contact with their fellow Indian acquaintances (Ebr.-
Vally, 2001). In fact, the labourers who were shipped out rarely had enough money to make
the journey back to India; for most, it was a one-way ticket to another land. In other words,
the distance, both physical, but more so psychological, was so vast, that the motherland
remained frozen in the diasporic imagination as a sort of sacred site or symbol , almost like an
idol of memory and imagination. The poverty of the homeland, which caused the diaspora in
the first place, was forgotten or overwritten with the feeling that it was home, a place where
the present alienation of the diasporic person did not exist. Because a physical return was
virtually impossible, an emotional or spiritual renewal was an ongoing necessity. This was
done through a process of replication, if not reproduction (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). As Mishra
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(1996) puts it, "the old Indian diaspora replicated the space of India and sacralized the stones
and rivers of the new lands" (1996: 442). To put it differently, the old diaspora carried with it
a sort of "Hindu toolbox" or frame of reference to Indianize its new surroundings:
Their homeland is a series of objects, fragments ofnarratives that they keep in their heads or
in their suitcases. Like hawkers they can reconstitute their lives through the contents of their
knapsacks: a Ganapati icon, a dog-eared copy of the Gita or the Quran, an old sari or other
deshi outfit, a photograph of a pilgrimage or, in modem times, a videocassette of the latest hit
from the home country (Mishra, 1996: 68).
It is also important to note that the old diaspora, which constituted of mainly subaltern and
underprivileged classes, hardly produced any literature at all. Theirs was still mostly an oral
culture. This oral cultural feature is still very inherent among the Muslims of indenture
ancestry living in South Africa today. Due to their close geographical but also class and
economic association with mostly Hindu and Tamil Indians dating back from long ago, they
have internalised some Hindu and Tamil religious practices and have adapted those to their
own interpretation and practice of Islam. Today the Sunni Sufis, which follows the tradition
of the Saints, is proof of this religious assimilation and adaptation, a religious trend amongst
Durban's Muslims informed by the Barelwi school, founded in India by Ahmad Raza Khan
(1856-1922), of Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh. In South Africa this tradition found expression
through Soofie Sabeb and his family (Vabed, 2000). The main followers are amongst Urdu-
speaking descendants of indentured Muslims and this folk religion is a more populist form of
Islam. It involves the public celebration of important occasions such as the birthday of the
Prophet, the holding of Mawloods, and the recitation of communal salutations (salaam)
during which followers stand as a mark of respect for the Prophet. On the other hand, the new
diaspora followed the Deobandi school of thought, which was established in India from the
1860s at Deoband near the Sabaranpur in the United Provinces. They focused on ministering
to the educational and religious needs of Muslims. Deobandi Ulema in Durban have always
been closely aligned to the Gujarati trading class. In this tradition emphasis is placed on the
central role of the Ulema in defining the 'correct' practice of Islam. Closely allied is the role
of the Tabligh Jamaat , founded in India by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885-1994). The
focus of this movement is on 'an unquestioning loyalty to a literal interpretation of Prophetic
authority. Followers of the Jamaat go from mosque to mosque and house to house to preach a
'purified' form of Islam. The movement first made inroads in South Africa in the early 1960s
amongst Gujarati traders.
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One of the major factors that differentiated the indentured labourers and the passenger Indians
was the fact that the passenger Indians kept a regular and lively correspondence with their
Indian counterparts living in India. This was a result of two factors; firstly the passenger
Indians had the financial means to post letters, or travel back to India for visiting their
families and friends, unlike the indentured labourers who were not allowed to leave South
Africa due to contractual obligations and lack of money; secondly the passenger Indians were
educated and consequently had the cultural capital that allowed them to keep contact (Ebr.-
Vally, 2001). Unsurprisingly enough, this supposedly superior characteristic of the passenger
Indians allowed them to predominate over the other Muslim Indian migrants. The passenger
Indians further differed from their indentured counterparts by the way they formed and
organised sub-communities. Unlike indentured labourers who were forced to compromise on
religious and social values due to their restricted quarters, which in turn, forced Muslims,
Hindus and Tamils to co-habit close to each other, the passenger Indians could use their
values to form different sub-communities, much like is the case in Indian Gujarati social
structure (Vahed, 2000). The obvious purpose of this exercise was to re-create the social and
religious structures with which they were familiar. In this way, people from the same villages
in Gujarat could re-group together and speak their common language in an attempt to re-
establish the systems of network that pervaded in India and stratify social classes . For
example the indentured Indians spoke Urdu, which was regarded as inferior by the passenger
Indians, whereas the latter group spoke Gujarati , which was seen to be more refined. This also
functioned as a means of determining the status of a family in terms of lineage. An important
result of this stratification was to openly differentiate between languages spoken by Muslim
Indians in order to recognize which were/are of indentured origin and who of passenger
Indian origin.
An interesting phenomenon is that the Gujarati language acquired a different status from that
in India. Whereas, in India, Gujarati is a means of communication, in South Africa it was and
is still viewed as the language of Hindus. This is largely due to the high literacy rate of
Gujarati prevalent amongst the Hindus who originated from the State of Gujarat. As a result,
Indian Muslims who came from Gujarat tend to associate the language with Hinduism. They
therefore send their children to madrasahs, or Islamic schools, where their children learn
about the precepts of Islam but also learn Arabic. Strangely enough, the curriculum is such
that children learn about Islamic geographic spaces and not those of India, once again
highlighting the importance of the Ummah in Islamic teachings.
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Another fascinating phenomenon is that Indians in South Africa were regarded with contempt
by the Blacks and Whites alike, where proficiency in English and/or Afrikaans improved their
levels of adaptation. Their survival in South Africa did not depend on how well they spoke
their own vernaculars, but on how proficient they became in some of the South African
languages. Thus the quasi-disappearance of the vernacular languages impacted not only on
the image and memory they retained of India but also on the form that Islam would take, more
so amongst the passenger Indians (Ebr.-Vally, 2001). The fading of Indian in their memories
was also seen as the purging of their 'Hinduness' , or 'Indianness, in their practice of Islam.
Although this in contradiction to the level with which Indian Muslims maintain the caste
system, their religion, Islam, as an identity marker is a trope that allows us to comprehend
how they have modified their identity to construct a distance between them and India, and in
so doing implant themselves more firmly in South Africa. Though, as pointed out earlier,
Islam being an essentially egalitarian and equalising religion, rejecting the caste system,
forms of social stratification resembling the caste system still pervade among the Indian
Muslims in Natal-Natal to this day. The most striking example was/is the arranging of
marriages that is based in many ways, on kinship ties from India. In spite of strongly denying
the presence of a social class system, Muslims acknowledge that marriages are often done
according to the biradari (fraternity), the kutum (joint household) , as well as specific marital
rituals practiced by well defined groups in South Africa. This transpires clearly when for
example, Sunni Sufis would read the salaam (praise of the Prophet) injamaat (congregations),
whereas the Tabliquis condemn that practice as being haraam (un-islamic), thus showing how
converts to Islam in India transformed and Islamified erstwhile Hindu practices.
Moreover the manner in which the new diaspora imagines India is consequently to be
comprehended in terms of the logic of this dominant culture, of which it is an ambivalent or
unwilling part. While the old diaspora was cut off from the motherland, the new diaspora has
unprecedented access to it by virtue of its privileged Non-Resident Indian status. What
transpires then is a narrative logic of continuous incorporation and appropriation, which
reinforces the self-validating logic of the new diaspora. Not forced to leave the motherland,
these traders have chosen to relocate themselves in the metropolitan centres chiefly for
economic gains. Some like Sayyid (2003) argue that choice of voluntary detachment from
Indian breeds a certain anxiety, if not guilt towards the homeland. In the international
academic and literary marketplace there is, and has always been, a niche market for fictional
representations of India. Whereas English, European and American writers previously
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occupied this Anglo-Indian slot, the Indians have now moved in. If the older indentured
somewhat subordinate culture of the old diaspora wants to be recognized in the same way, it
will have to reinvent itself in the image of the dominant culture of the metropolis. As Rushdie
(1991) argues:
Diasporic representations ofIndia can be harmful and misleading in at least two related ways.
First, they might end up usurping the space, which native self-representations are striving to
find in the international literary market place. Secondly, they may contribute to a continuing
"colonization" of the Indian psyche by pandering to Western market-tastes, which prefer to
see India in a negative light. Both these dangers arise not necessarily from a design on the part
of the expatriates to "sell" India, though the latter possibility cannot be dismissed too easily.
Rather, they are born out of the peculiar cultural politics of the diaspora (Rushdie, 1991: 19).
Therefore, in an attempt to avoid reductionism, it is vital to analyse and consider the Muslim
community in South Africa in terms of its subgroups. The selected parameters that illustrate
mutations and beliefs and practices that subgroups use to consolidate and propagate their
Islam points to the fact the Muslims community is not a homogenous entity. These beliefs and
practices are meaningful to members of a subgroup as well as to the larger Islamic
community. For, in such instances, the beliefs and practices act as 'markets of mutual
recognition that determine the cohesion of the subgroup' (Ebr.-Vally, 2001) as well as
informing their daily religious behaviour. In doing this, we can understand how Indian
Muslims make use of religion as their fundamental identity parameter to negotiate their space
in South Africa. The 'new' space negotiated through the prism of Islam can become either
inclusive or exclusive; in other words only Muslims can be members.
Yet, as in other religions, the implementation of Islam in specific places (geographies) with
specific cultural norms , necessitates that Islam is practised in tandem with a specific cultural
identity'" (Rafudeen, 2002) in spite of a supposed aversion of cultural characteristics that are
considered as being 'un-islamic' (related to beliefs that human-made cultures taints the
practice of 'true' Islam) . Culture, is defined by Hall (1995) as meaning "the systems of shared
meanings which people who belong to the same community, group, or nation use to help them
28 Hall's theory of identity to explore the ways in which the concept of identity "raises fundamental questions
about how individuals fit into the community and the social world and how identity can be seen as the interface
between subjective positions and social and cultural situations" (Hall 1996). Under apartheid Muslims had
'hybrid' identities that were situationally specific. Since 1994, Durban Muslims have been repositioning
themselves, in the context of an African-ruled democratic South Africa (Vahed 2000). Using Hall's notion of
symbolic marking, that is, the way people make sense of social relations and practices through inclusion and
exclusion, I aim to explore the underlying dynamics that inform Muslim identity in gated communities.
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make sense of the world" (Hall, 1995:176). Therefore, group identities of those who keep a
balance between culture, nationality and Islam need not always be negative (Rahman, 1979;
Ebr-Vally: 2001b). For instance, as Rafudeen (2002) explores, culture was the major
determinant that gave the Indian group in South Africa a sense ofbelonging and commonality
especially during the apartheid era, which was often needed to uphold one's individual
identity. Within the confined spaces allocated to Indians (Hindus and Muslims), the apartheid
system caused Indian Muslims to identify more with their Indian cultural markers, over and
above their Islamic identities, due to the need to identity a specific racial group. With the
advent of globalisation and identities of resistance, the dynamics of identity formation have
undergone significant paradigmatic changes amongst the South African Indian Muslims.
Muslim Diaspora in Durban
Today Durban is the most cosmopolitan city in South Africa in racial and cultural terms.
Islam is a minority religion in contemporary South Africa. However Muslims are far more
conspicuous and have a much more prolific profile than their numbers suggest. This is partly
due to the fact that large mosques dominate the skyline of every major South African city,
while men adorning traditional Arab dress and Muslim women in hijab (veil) are found
everywhere. In 2000, it was estimated that there were 79,630 Muslims in the Greater Durban
area. Most are third and fourth generation. Although Indian Muslims are removed to the
migration experience to a large extent (Statistics show that 93% consider English as their first
language) (Vahed, 2000), a large proportion of them still use their Indian languages at home.
An examination of their second language reveals that around 59% regard Urdu as their second
language, 28% Gujarati and Memon, and the rest declare Arabic, Telegu, Hindi, Tamil,
Koknee, Afrikaans or English as their second language. These language distinctions coincide
with class divisions. Table 1. illustrates the percentage distribution of Gujarati- and Urdu-
speaking Muslims in Durban by monthly income in year 1996.
Table 1. Percent distribution of Gujarati- and Urdu-speaking Muslims in Durban by
hi . 1996mont tv mcome,
Monthly Income Urdu-speaking Gujarati-speaking
R 6000 + 5.5 13.5
R 2500-5900 19.5 29.5
R Less than 2500 75.0 56.9
Source: South African PopulatIon Census, 1996.
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An important step in reconstructing religious life among the Muslim community was the
building of mosques. Mosques became the centre of Muslim worship and congregational
prayer and became the means to build community spirit (Vahed, 2000). The first mosque was
built in Grey Street in 1881 by the Indian traders Aboobakr Jhavery and Hajee Mahomed
Dada and is today the largest mosque in the southern hemisphere. There are approxiinately 80
mosques in Durban, which are linked formally or informally into either the Deobandi or
Barelwi networks. As the differences in these networks suggest, linguistic, regional, social
class and socio-economic status formed an inevitable part of Muslim identity as they
generated intrinsic differences in belief and practice. It is therefore incorrect to speak of a
Muslim community; it is more appropriate to speak of 'communities' in the plural.
Differences were not so much in what Muslims believed in but how they practiced.
Furthermore, prior to 1994, Indian Muslims in Durban were officially classified as 'Asian
Indian' (Vahed, 2000). Merchants and indentured Indians were drawn together because the
government promoted a pattern of stratification in which race shaped individual and
communal life experiences. This neutralized the impact of class and religion. Politically, this
forced a 'made in Natal ' consciousness and consolidated the 'Indian community'. Festivals
and rituals were important in consolidating religion. They were very visible markers of
identity, distancing Indians from Africans and whites and strengthening the links between
individuals and the 'community' . Many Hindus also participated in some of those rituals,
such as the festival of Muharram. The joint participation of Hindus and Muslims abridged
disparities between them and led them to focus on their common origins, a common history
and a common (Indian) identity, so much so that Muslims and Hindus celebrated the
independence of India together, as characteristic of diasporic communities (Vahed, 2000).
The Globalisation Discourse
Globalisation is conceived by Soja (2000) as:
"The compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a
whole, bringing with it the deepening and widening of worldwide social relations which link
distant localities in such a 'Yay that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles
away and vice versa". (2000)
Much of the concept of diaspora can be linked to the local community I am analysing.
Globalisation and its accompanying dichotomies of being a carrier of both opportunities and
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complexities (Castells, 1996) especially on the socio-cultural arena, plays an important role in
(re) shaping identities of global citizens. Within the age of globalisation, the domination of
nature by culture is at its height (Castells, 1996). The metaphor of living in the global village
results not only in questioning the validity of geography as a discipline itself, but also in an
inevitable acceleration of life, experienced in particular in the urban areas, where the process
of 'de-traditionalization', as elucidated by McLuhan (in Leyshon, 1995: 32), dominates in
terms of "rolling social life away from fixities of tradition". Indeed, it is argued that we have
entered an era of global capitalism that is marked by a new international division of labour in
which industrial production/urbanism has become more widely distributed over the inhabited
world than ever before (Soja, 2000). The rising status of the NICs (newly industrialized
countries) and the creation of new industrial spaces which had previously never undergone
major significant industrialization (for example, Silicon Valley), combined with the de-
industrialization of many old Fordist manufacturing regions, are interpreted as embodying the
emergence of a new and restructured global space economy'". Some of the reasons for this
change in the new Age of Globalism are the accelerated movement of people, goods, services ,
and information across national borders and the growth of global markets for labour and
globally networked commodities, the space-spanning and networking effects of the
telecommunications and information revolution and, the concentration of political and
economic power in a re-ordered hierarchy of global cities acting as command posts for
controlling the changing financial operations of the world economy (Soja, 2000).
Each of these processes of change has provided a focal point in studying the geopolitical
economy of globalisation and is the subject of a large and growing literature. To explain the
geopolitical economy of globalisation, one has to consider two encompassing categories; the
globalisation of capital and the globalisation of labour. The globalisation of capital is usually
measured by indicators such as foreign direct investment, the growth of foreign investment in
the domestic economy, the increasing importance of import and export trade, and the
29 It is precisely this ordered configuration of international relations, which has lasted in relatively stable forms
since the late 19th century , that is currently being substantially restructured in what some have called an era of
flexible accumulation and "disorganized" capitalism. While the commercial and financial circuits of capital are
playing a vital role in this restructuring, it is the expanding geographical scope of productive industrial capital
that most distingu ishes the present era of globalization. Formerly confined to the core industrial countries, urban-
based industrial capitalist production has spread to many ,more parts of the world that ever before, exemplified
most directly in the growing list of NlCs. This has been associated with a breakdown of the old international (or
int~rstate) capitalist world economy and its distinctive spatial (or territorial) divisions of labor based primaril y on
nation-states; and its reconfigurations as an intensified global or transnational capitalist economy with a "new
world order" of networked flows and linkages that are no longer as confined by national boundaries as they were
in the past (see Soja, 2000).
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intensification of other "flows (ofmoney, jobs, services, and workers) across national borders.
When viewed from a broader perspective, the globalisation of capital has traditionally been
studied with respect to three interlocking circuits of capital flow: commercial trade, financial
investment, and industrial production. As suggested earlier, it is the expansion, diffusion, and
networking of industrial capital and industrial urbanism on a global scale that can be seen as
the most distinctive feature of the current phase of globalisation (Soja, 2000). It is precisely
the latter occurrence that concerns most geopolitical economists'",
The other side of global capitalism is defined by the globalisation of labour. Capital is more
flexible and able to 'move' more than labour, the latter remaining linked to national localized
labour markets. However, the globalisation of production has induced by its very nature, an
increased globalisation of labour, and larger-scale migrations of people towards the major
globalised nodal cityscapes of the world. As a result, the past thirty years has witnessed an
increasing volume of migration across national boundaries, including both voluntary and
involuntary migration. Moreover, the nature of this migration has involved significant
numbers of people from more countries and cultures than ever before, thereby populating
global cities with what Appadurai (1996) calls ethnoscapes. This process has led to the
production of a truly global proletariat, but one that remains highly fragmented, difficult to
organize, and not yet conscious of its potential global power (Soja; 2000). However, this
intensified migration of people is geographically haphazardly developed in its impact and
intensity, as well as open to many different interpretations of its causes and consequences.
Global flows of capital investment, labour migration, information, and technological
innovation are reshaping city space and local capital-labour relations, creating new industrial
spaces, a reshuffling of class identities, different urban divisions of labour, and are-polarized
and re-fragmented pattern of social and spatial stratification (Soja, 2000).
30 The general academic and policy discourse , however, has focused more heavily on either the commercial
circuit , viewing globalization primarily in terms of the growth and repatterning of world trade ; or the
technology-led new phase of transnational fmancial integration and electronic networking that is reshaping the
flow of money, credit , and investment in what some observers describe as an increasingly borderless world. On
c~ crudely categon.ze .the discou~e on the globalization of capital according to which of these 3 emphases is
given the greatest pnonty: Production, Trade, or Finance (Soja, 2000).
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Appadurai (1996) outlines a basic framework to explore "global cultural processes" based on
five interrelated cultural-economic landscapes" , which he also calls ' imagined worlds '. "The
suffix scape" , he writes, "allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes ,
shapes that characterize international capital as deeply as they do international clothing
styles" (1996: 33). Ethnoscapes , his primary interest, are formed by global flows of people
(tourists, refugees and immigrants such as the Muslim Indians), now intensified to an
unparalleled level of scale and scope both in material terms and in the global imaginary.
Appadurai's (1996) trans-national anthropological study of ' scapes' and flows, characterizes
the advent of a potent postcolonial cultural perspective that reflects more on the disruptive ,
conflict-filled heterogeneity of this disordered post-modem world than on the homogenizing
effects of global interdependence and consciousness. The globalisation discourse is seen not
simply from the dialectic ofhomogenization-heterogenization but around what is expressed as
multiple scales ofhybridity, the places and people who are most involved in the tensions and
cultural manifestations arising from what Appadurai (1996) terms as cultural "glocalization"
or trans-nationalism. Two of these scales feature most notably in the post-colonial critiques:
the nation-state and nationalism on the one hand, and the production of locality and local
identity on the other, but it is the interaction and hybridisation across many different scales,
from the most global to the most local and individualized, that is of primary importance as
well as the interplay between deterritorialization32 and reterritorialization.
This recipe suggests the complex simultaneity of two intermingled processes of restructuring.
One the one hand, deterritorialization, involving the collapse of Fordist means of production
and traditional spatial divisions of labour, and established patterns of real-and-imagined
cultural and spatial identity at every scale from the local to the global, and one the other hand,
reterritorialization, being the critical response to globalisation and post-fordist restructuring,
31 Finanscapes focus around the now more "mysterious, rapid and difficult to follow" landscape of global
capital, where "megamonies move through national turnstiles at blinding speed". Further "defracting" the deeply
disjunctive relationships between these first 3 scapes are two realms of created imagery . Mediascapes, based on
"image-centered, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality" electronically disseminated by newspapers,
magazines, television stations, film studios, and other globalized media, provide "large and complex repertoires
of images, narratives , and ethnoscapes to viewers throughout the world, in which the world of commodities and
world of news and politics are profoundly mixed" Appadurai , 1996: 33).
32 Harvey discusses how capitalist enterprises control time and space by relocating operations. As he puts it,
"any struggle to reconstitute power relations is a struggle to reorganize their spatial bases ," which is why
capitalism constantly detterritorializes and reterritorializes". Such deterritorialized nation-state building is
something new and significant, a form ofpost-colonial nationalism that reflects and reinforces the division of the
entire globe into nation-states. Deterritorialization in this sense contrasts with the concept of diaspora whereby
people imagine themselves as a nation outside of a homeland". Another sense of deterritorialization has to do
with the construction of "hyperspaces", i.e. environments such as airports, hyper-real places such as amusement
parks and wax museums in which simulacra are seen as more real than the real thing" (Kearney , 1995:553)
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generating new efforts by individuals sectors, cultures and nations, to reshape their territorial
behaviour, their fundamental spatiality and lived spaces, as a means of resisting and/or
adapting to the contemporary condition (Appadurai, 1996).
Space and the Identity discourse
As argued above, globalisation refers to social, economic, cultural, and demographic
processes that occur within nations but also transcend them, such that attention limited to
local processes, identities, and units of analysis yields incomplete understanding of the local"
(Kearney, 1995: 548). In other words, globalisation is a process whereby the intensification of
worldwide social relations helps to link far-away localities so much so that local activities are
shaped and influenced by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Kearney, 1995).
Globalisation, being a process generated through migration, commerce, communication
technologies, finance, tourism, etc. leads to a restructuring of the bipolar metaphor of space
and time of modern worldview. The spatial correlate of this time has metropolitan centres and
peripheral sites linked together by lines of communication. As a result, the process of
globalisation involves a shift from two-dimensional Euclidian space with its centres and
peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multidimensional global space with unrestrained, often
sporadic and interpenetrating sub-spaces (Kearney, 1995).As a result of this virtual proximity
of centres and peripheries, local cultures are becoming increasingly detteritorialized. Not only
does deterritorialization blur any notion of bounded cultures, but so does the constantly
increasing volume and velocity of global dissemination of information, images, and simulacra
that is a diffusion of cultural traits gone wild, and creating a nightmare for contemporary
cross-cultural correlational studies. Such flows require a reconsideration of presumably
bounded culture areas (Kearney, 1995)
Spatiality is a key concept in the present context of globalisation. Knowing where one is
placed is fundamental to an understanding of self and it is therefore relevant to explore the
ways in which space is able to inform identityr'. Spatiality may in theory bear a huge
33 Identity matters, both in terms of social and political concerns within the contemporary world and within
academic discourses where identity has been seen as conceptually important in offering explanations of social
and cultural changes. The following chapters will explore the ways in which the concept of identity raises
fundamental questions about how individuals fit into the community and the social world and how identity can
be seen as the interface between subjective and social and cultural situations. Identity gives us an idea of who we
are and how we relate to others and to the world in which we live. Identity marks the ways in which we are the
same as others who share that position, and the ways in which we are different from those who do not. Often
identity is most clearly defined by difference that is by what it is not. Identities may be marked by polarization:
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influence on the identity of groups or individuals. Dixon & Durrheim (2000) have recently
explored how the environmental concept of 'place-identity' may be framed within a critical
discursive approach. Such an approach focuses particularly on the collective practices through
which specific place identities are framed, reproduced and modified, in addition to how
constructions of place are oriented to the performance of social actions (blaming, justifying,
excusing, excluding, etc) (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). One of the features that emerges in
recent studies of human geography are non-essentialist and constantly evolving concepts of
culture and identity, and how the two usually combine to impact upon individuals and groups
in society (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992; Clifford, 1994). In the case of Islam, however,
group/community identity, as well as a preference of religion over culture and nationality is
viewed as the ideal over and above individual and situated identities as discussed earlier
(Vahed, 2001).
Resistance identities
Drawing from the writings of Pile & Keith (1997: 14), a series of resistance strategies can be
drawn through which people in the contemporary world express themselves, ranging from
ear-splitting music and following outrageous fashions, from sit-ins to outings, all of which
provide the individual the possibility to change things through finding their own ways to
'struggle' , and avoid the forces in power that are seen as oppressive. According to Castells
(1997), resistance identities arise from defensive reactions to three main trends , namely
reaction against globalisation (which erodes the sense of control and autonomy of the
marginalized), secondly against networking and flexibility which blur social relationships,
and thirdly against the crisis of the patriarchal family which forms the basis ofmany societies
worldwide but which is in rapid transition. Consequently, following Castells' logic, it is
unsurprising that "these defensive reactions become the sources of meaning and identity by
constructing new cultural codes out of historical materials" (Castells, 1997: 66). Due to the
fact that the more intangible flows and the virtual realities of the Information Age
encapsulated within the network society is beyond the mastering of the marginalized,
resistance finds better breeding grounds in the space of physical places, or what Castells
(1997) calls 'reverse information flows' .
for example in the most extreme forms of national or ethnic conflict, and by the marking of inclusion or
exclusion - insiders and outsiders, 'us' and 'them'.
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As argued earlier, the construction and establishment of identity involves the process of
individuation, as the individual is engaged in a private process of finding him/herself, as
opposed to accepting societal identity roles. Out of three types of identity formations
proposed by Castells (1997) namely; 'legitimising identity', 'resistance identity' , 'project
identity' , resistance identity is seemingly most relevant for Indian Muslim identities in
Durban. Contrary to legitimising identities, which generate a civil society in the form of
organizations, institutions and social actors that rationalizes the sources of societal power
relations through consent, 'resistance identity' is mainly concerned with the formation of
'cultural communes' or communities of resistance. Inscribed within identities of resistance,
lie the questions of spatiality and the politics oflived spaces (Pile & Keith, 1996: 27). In other
words, struggles that occur regarding issues of identity formation and political claims making,
involve clear identified spatialities of struggle. This is in tum closely linked with one of the
most important concepts within cultural geography; the sense of place that informs the
'rootedness' of identities (Rose, 1995). Identification with or against certain places and spaces
on varying levels (local, national or global) is said to involve human emotions and memories
but also politics and representation as social interactions and power relations define as
individual's sense of place. The same is true when it comes to the human placedness of
'cultures' because they are socially constructed and imagined (Hall, 1995). Despite the
localization of identities, it has been argued that in an age of globalisation where geography is
being questioned, the trend is increasingly towards both the virtual and physical erosion of
boundaries. Thus the 'rootedness ' and the 'placedness' of identities (especially communal) is
the subject ofheated debate among scholars (Rose, 1995).
The politics of identity is consequently invariably linked with the politics ofplace and space,
as with the geography of location and territorialization. Resistance involves the spatialities of
location and boundaries, the process of movement from one place to another. What Robins
(cited in Massay, 1995: 79) calls a 'geography of rejection' may entail a purification process,
that is social groups desiring the maintenance of their exclusive and purified identities in
space as a defensive strategy. This is precisely the space where the politics of identity is said
to be fertile whereby the processes of claiming power through different sense of place is
made, and as the insider-outsider dichotomy is played by different social groupings through
the process of 'othering ' (Rose, 1995). Scholars thus argue for a contextual understanding of
resistance, as not always situated and emanating physically through spatial practices or places,
but also through emotions or experiences often termed as 'power' such a desire, anger,
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happiness, fear and dreaming. In advocating geographies of resistance from this perspective
whereby resistance involves spatialities that lie beyond 'power' in alternative grounds, Keith
& Pile (1996) claim that tactics of resistance are inscribed into spaces that are only partly
controlled by the powerful. This is in tum means that while the spaces of resistance are dis-
located from the spaces of the powerful, resistance seeks to recreate new meanings out of
imposed meanings and to "re-work" and divert space to other ends" (Keith & Pile, 1996: 16).
Keith and Pile's use of the highly dynamic concept 'psychic resistance' is offered as another
type of resistance, expressed out of sense of threat to one's identity and thereby through
feelings of fear, desire, and nostalgia amongst others.
We have seen how identity and location are inseparable: knowing oneself is an exercise in
mapping where one stands. Consequently, it is fair to suggest that spatialities, especially post-
modem spatialities, have produced landscapes that are loaded with ethical, epistemological
and aestheticized meanings. An articulation of identity is only momentarily complete, as it is
always partly constituted by the forces that oppose it (the constitutive outside), always
contingent upon surviving the contradictions that it subsumes (forces of dislocation). In such a
malleable world of identity formation, subjects are articulated through "moments of closure
that create subjects as surfaces of inscription, mythical and metaphoric, invariably
incomplete" (Keith & Pile, 1996). Thus, identities and their conditions of existence are
inseparable. Identity cannot exist outside of its context. "Identity depends on conditions of
existence which are contingent, its relationship with them is absolutely necessary" (1996:20).
It is crucial to understand that identity is always an incomplete process. Sometimes, while
trying to make sense of a particular moment or a particular place (synchronic analysis), this
process is stopped to reveal an identity, just like capturing a photograph of a racehorse at full
gallop. While the photograph may be a ' true' representation of a particular moment by its
frozen nature, it does not reveal the full identity of that horse as the photograph represents a
momentary stop in this gallop, simultaneously real and unreal, it is a moment in time that has
been captured and cannot be interpreted as being an accurate representation of the horse or
that moment. On a more technical level, synchronic analysis is necessarily a process of
sometimes justifiable misrepresentation (Keith & Pile, 1996). This is why identity is always
incomplete, always subsumes a lack, and perhaps is more readily understood as a process
rather than an outcome. Identity should always be a process, never an artefact.
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The post-modem position is that identities, which provide individuals with concrete spatial
locations as social individuals, are fluid and changing. According to Hall (2000), identities are
constantly being negotiated in the 'interaction' between individual and society. The inner core
of an individual (the real me) is adapted in 'dialogue with the cultural worlds outside and the
identities which they offer' (2000). Consequently, identity becomes moveable: formed and
transformed constantly in relation to the ways we are represented or addresses in the cultural
systems that surround us. As far as South Africa is concerned;
"There is no fundamental identity that any South African clings to in common with all, or
even most other South Africans. South Africans have multiple identities in common contexts
(e.g. political party) and common identities in multiple contexts...a Muslim, may span many
religious, political, social and cultural contexts and thus link them together into a social
universe. These identities, then, can be said to be multiple and crosscutting in that each
overlaps a range of contexts, or a common context or institution may contain many identities
within it". (Thorton, 1996: 150-151).
The people living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest epitomize an Indian diaspora,
which has maintained some aspects of its homeland culture but which has also joined the
global capitalist marathon by advocating the existence of social and class disparities between
themselves and the 'others'. By using the concepts of globalisation and identity formation, I
analyse the markers that inform the identities of the people living in Umhlanga Halls and
Umhlanga Crest, while taking to account their contribution in the re-shaping of the urban





I tap myfeet impatiently on the pavement as I wait for the bus that goes to Umhlanga. The bus
is 15 minutes late. I am going to Umhlanga for the first time. Beside me, stands a tall white
girl, looking extremely lost and flustered. I hesitate a briefmoment, I have never been one for
talking to strangers but I smile all the same. She tells me that she has a job interview in
Gateway and sighs in reliefwhen I tell her that I'm waitingfor the same bus. She says: "Oh
thank goodness, it's my first time going on my own to Umhlanga and I am totally lost ", and
immediately moves awayfrom me. Her reaction makes me smile internally; I had experienced
the same relief a week earlier when catching the mini taxi to Umgeni to renew my study
permit. I had met this black woman, asked her for directions, .and then quickly withdrew to
establish my differential space. Ethnocentric fear is entrenched to such a large extent in South
Africa that it is practically impossible not to see it. But then I had withdrawn because I
wanted to avoid any familiarity between the black stranger who was obviously of a lower
social class than I was and who I wasn't sure I could trust.
Such is my first field note entry.
I watch the scenery from my window seat in the bus. As we enter Umhlanga, I see a golf
course, one that is beautifully mowed and maintained. Unsurprisingly, the players are all
white. The houses gradually become bigger and bigger. I am nervous - this whole area is so
well kept and laid out... neat - so neat like I have never seen before. The bus occasionally
stops to pick up passengers, a couple ofyoung yuppie whitepassengers get into the bus; to my
pleasure and surprise, the surfer-looking white lad greets a black mama sitting next to him in
Zulu... a smile. Could it be that the younger generation is less ethnocentric that the older
generation? We pass by "Our lady ofFathima Government School". The name Fathima is
like a relief .. a sort ofinstant recognition.... A feeling ofwarmth washes over me... there is
no doubt that I havefound some kind ofconnection with this Muslim name.
I worry about not being properly dressed to meet my host, I look down at my shoes, old
unfeminine black shoes .... the same shoes that I wear everyday to go to campus because
they're comfortable. I wonder whether I should not have dressed differently - maybe in a
moreformal way. This is silly .... and I feel silly ...for beingso self-conscious.
We reach a valley-like area populated by green-roofed houses, pretty and ornately designed.
This is obviously not a squatter camp urban planning ... I even come across a mini gated
condominium. Somerset Park, I cannot help myself from marvelling at the beauty of the
landscape ofthat community - sort oflike the gated area I had in my imagination.... I wonder




Understanding how Muslim residents make sense of living inside gated communities requires
connecting the experiential and psychological levels of explanation with a critical analysis of
society. Interviews and participant observation provide data on individuals, families,
neighbourhoods, while comparative studies, theoretical treatises, and reviews of
advertisements, television and radio transcripts, and newspaper reports generate a broader
view of the societal impact. Bringing these levels together without losing the complex reality
of individual experience can be accomplished by examining how social and political forces -
through ideology and practice - are manifest in everyday behaviour and conversations.
Another difficulty is portraying myself as an active participant in the creation of this work.
Often, the author is presented as an uninvolved, anonymous observer without gender, class,
tastes, or preferences. In critical analysis as well as in ethnography the author is sometimes
obscured, as if he/she were not the narrative's producer, interpreter or guide. I address these
concerns by using three narrative voices - a personal voice, the voices of the interviewees,
and a professional voice - to present residents' lives, motivations and concerns. Through my
eyes, thoughts, academic musings, and interpretations, the reader learns about my subject
community. By interposing memoir and interviews, I elucidate the interconnection between
the experience ofme and my subject.
Due to the nature of the methodology used, results rely to a large extent on material ,
conversations, and observations as they were presented to me. For this reason, information
gathered from women in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest does not follow identical
formats nor constitutes an equal quantity for all issues examined. I hope that respect for each
research partner's opinion is conveyed, although it should be remembered that all data has
been either consciously or subconsciously been submitted to my own reasoning and
theoretical framework. I will examine these instances where possible. The opinions expressed
by research partners are in the present tense to convey the immediacy of the field even though
the data collected has a definite historical specificity, as the notion of changing circumstances
and relations in identity construction is central to this research work. The oral expressions
recorded here, however, are equal if not more valuable than the literary texts, which are cited
in the present tense. First names are used (instead of sumames) for research partners to avoid
repetition because several interviewees have the same surname. I begin this chapter with my
own personal field note. I then examine the evidence and explore the conflicts - conscious
and unconscious - in what is said, as well as in what is left unsaid. I am interested particularly
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in how political and economic perspectives illuminate the psychological, and how personal
experience sheds light on the social.
Heterotopia - The Case of Umhlanga Halls
As has been previously established, the difference between space and place are that 'places'
are to be understood as spaces that have become imprecated with social values , meanings and
identity, whereas space is engaged in as principally as an element of discourse. In other
words, space is used to refer to the surrounding environment that people inhabit. Places,
however, refers to socially constructed or manipulated spaces that have been/are deliberately
politicised, culturally relative and historically specific to match the needs of people inhabiting
those meaningful spaces.
Ellin (1997) argues that although post-modern architecture and urbanism are very diverse,
they can be understood simply as "a coherence . ..based on the heterogeneous substance and
nature of modem society" (1997: 113). In other words, post-modem urbanism can be
conceptualised as a re-action against modernism and its images of perfection and utopia
(Giddens, 1990). It becomes a specific approach to urban design in a specific period of time:
Furthermore, Ellin (1997) provides us with a summary of the characteristics of post-modem
urbanism: historicism (reaction to modernism's break with the past), contextualism (character
of peace and identity), use of symbolism, apoliticism, anti-autocratic, art as a commodity,
traditional building and use of familiar elements. In short, whereas in modem design "form
follows function", in post-modern design, "form follows fiction, fear, finesse and finance"
(1997:133). In this sense, the phenomenon of gated communities in South Africa are a typical
example of this post-modem feature as they are the creation of secured and peaceful spaces
(form follows fear) with a distinctive identity and style (form follows fiction and finesse) to
ensure a specific lifestyle and provide social and economic control. This is done through the
privatisation of public space, services and governance (form follows finance) (Landman,
2002). As a result of these post-modern urbanist interventions, such as the emergence of gated
communities, there has been a growing decline of public space and desire to control one's
space, whereby the notion of space is now becoming increasingly transformed in a
compartmentalized way (Ellin, 1997). It is evident from the discussion of the privatisation of
space, manifested through various forms of gated communities, often leads to the privatisation
of local control as well. This is often enforced by fortification and access control.
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The autonomy, which the Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest so outwardly strive to
achieve, is indicated by the fact that these areas of development maintain not only their own
bylaws, but also the ' architectural mandate' over their own areas to a very large degree (Hook
& Vrdoljak, 2001). Unlike the large majority of building projects that are spread across the
city of Durban, the eThekwini city council has only limited powers of intervention within
such gated community complexes (2001) . An obvious sign of the gated community's
autonomy is given in its lack of engagement with national architectural and city-planning
debates on how best to restructure South African cities in ways that will facilitate the de-
segregation, racial integration and overall urban renewal of cities (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001) .
The main priority of the gated community developers is to build on the ever more northerly
outskirts of Durban, beyond the traditional limits of the city, to escape by as far as possible
the feared urban centre. The agenda of the gated community developers is the creation of
severe and inviolable security, where one 's right to property and personal privacy is sacred.
The zeal of the attempt to fortify against the threat of crime has meant that gated community
developers have placed an inordinate emphasis on familial and personal security, on efficient
and safe-proof crime prevention. In a sense, these collaborations of local governance and
building industry innovation have thus far outstripped any contribution by the state in respect
of successful crime prevention (Kruger et al., 1997).
Furthermore, the guards who are employed to uphold security measures are typically well-
trained and are often attired in para-military garb, prepared to strike in defence of the gated
community space and to rebuff crime in an 'armed response ' capacity. In line of this, it is no
coincidence that private security personnel in South Africa now outnumber the police by two
to one (Bremner, 1999). The separation of the gated community from the rest of the South
African suburban/urban society is also a 'concrete' question of barred-off roads, impassable
walls , electrified fences , booms and razor wire. This is a situation whereby suburban
fortification has become so highly desirable that it has faded and fused into fantasy and
pastiche (Bremner, 1999). The gated community is reminiscent of the game lodge, or the
theme park, in its attempt to get ' closer to nature' and by virtue of its electrified fences and
patrolling guards - in the way it attempts to ensure that an inner core of cleared space is sealed
off from the country at large (Ndebele, 1999). The stark contradictions of nature against
sophisticated surveillance technology, of safety despite urban detachment manifests very
clearly in Umhlanga Manors. Security, manufactured and computerised to the utmost degree,
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becomes synonymous with this 'natural environment' , and along with it, a pre-requisite for
peaceful living (Hook & Vrdoljak, 2001).
Analysing the data
Umhlanga is located some twenty kilometres north of the city of Durban, in the KwaZulu-
Natal province in South Africa. Umhlanga, known for its beautiful scenery, protected natural
environment, upper class citizenship, and economically stable government - has become not
only an eco-tourism scene but also a desirable retirement for high-income Durbanites, and a
highly sought-after 'safe' area in which higher-middle class people can buy property and be
away from the city centre. Located in central Urnhlanga, Umhlanga Halls is a gated
condominium made up of large single detached houses, built on land that was previously
owned by Tongaat-Hulette. A security guard controls the entrance gate and does not allow
any unannounced visitors to go in without thoroughly scrutinizing them carefully. Houses are
situated along a winding thoroughfare with dead-end streets branching off, leading to groups
of houses clustered quite close together on small lots. The whole community includes
approximately seventy houses. The houses are attractively neat, green-roofed with perfectly
mowed lawns in front of each house and closely aligned to one another.
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Meeting Bilkis
I am meeting Bilkis for the first time. She meets me in Gateway, a very high-flying shopping
centre. She is an attractive thirty-something woman, wearing khaki pants, t-shirt and her head
ofcovered by a scarf I hop into her large white BMW. She smiles and says hello. She is not
what I expected at all. We start chatting right away and I instantly feel comfortable around
her. She is articulate and gets right to the point. We talk about her reasons for moving to
Umhlanga" - she tells me she was located in La Mercy35 prior to 1994, and emphasizes that
La Mercy was the only Indian community living near the beach during the apartheid era. She
also points out that the Indians ofLa Mercy had privileges ofuse ofthe beach.
"I moved to Umhlanga because it was more convenient for my children, for school purposes.
I never sent my children to the schools in La Mercy because the black kids started coming in
and it became too rowdy and I preferred to send them to Umhlanga where I knew the schools
were better and less mixed. When I was living in La Mercy, I had to drive some ten to fifteen
minutes every morning to drop them, so now it's just around the corner and much safer too ".
I wonder about the real reasons for which she moved. Could it be the fear ofinter-racial mix?
Despite the demise of Apartheid, it is quite common to find ethnocentric attitudes still
prevailing among people in South Africa. People still define themselves according to race in
contemporary South Africa. Somehow I have always been torn between trying to explain to
my friends that being wary of black people does not help much in bringing about the
'rainbow' nation" that is very much talked about, and, trying to overcome my own fears,
fears that are largely based on stereotypes.
"I was attacked twice. My car was stopped and I was robbed...you can never be safe in South
Africa nowadays", she says, emphasizing her reason for moving to Umhlanga Halls. I cannot
help but wonder what it would be like to be South African. The fact that I'm only a transient
international student here does not allow me the luxury offully understanding that inherent
fear that seems to pervade in this country since the demise ofApartheid.
She takes me to the mosque and introduces me to the Imam who, I'm told is a black man from
Malawi. I greet the man who looks rather friendly and approachable. Bilkis is very involved
in the community. She is directly involved in the mosque as her husband sits on the directing
committee. She is also in charge of the ladies' side of the mosque - she sees to the
management and maintenance. We take a look around as the maid arrives. Bilkis reprimands
the maidfor not cleaning properly and tells her to go clean the marble floor again.
We talk briefly about the people that come to the mosque. "The mosque is for everyone in
Umhlanga. When we moved here, the community decided that it was important for us to have
a mosque because there was no other place that everyone could meet. So the men got together
and built it with their own funds unfortunately there are some people in the community that
have disagreements with others you know the Tabligh Jamaat and the Sunni Sufis have
different ways of doing things, but the Imam has been asked to read for everyone. It was
agreed by the committee that the mosque would be used by everyone".
34 Appendix 1 for location of the Greater Durban Area
35 See Appendix 2 for location of Umhlanga
36 As part of its reconstruction plan, the government has promoted the notion of the 'new' South Africa being a
'rainbow' nation, whereby people of all races (and therefore all colours) join together side by side to form a
symbolic 'rainbow'.
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"My own husband is from a Sunni Sufi family, and he used to live downtown when I first met
him. I hated the place he lived in, and my in-laws are totally oblivious to the situation. I just
don't agree with their Sunni practices, and that's why I couldn't live with them. Of course I
also wanted to have my own space. Besides, most of the Muslims living in Umhlanga are
Tablighi", they are the ones who have the money".
I have to admit, I can identify with some of the things she says. Coming from a Muslim
background, I have also been torn between the two schools of thought myself and am very
acquainted with the numerous contentions between the opposite views.
A few minutes later, we leave the mosque and drive to her house. "Now you will see where I
live, the servants quarters!" I look up in surprise, I am somewhat aghast by her comment.
"The people living in Umhlanga Crest see us as living in servants quarters. All my friends
joke and ask me why I chose this gated community - it's less up-market that Umhlanga Crest,
but I told them that I liked it better there, it is quieter and there are less people poking into
your affairs". We drive through the gate.
"The Indians in Chatsworth and Phoenix are very different from us. I have been to
Chatsworth a few only and I hated it, it's disgusting there... you know how people live their
lives there, the houses are so close to each other and it's so dirty. People have no class at
all". We both laugh. I am a bit uneasy about my own position regarding her comment about
Chatsworth and Phoenix being different.
Markers of cultural capital
Bilkis's comments raise a few important questions regarding the reasons for which she
decided to move to Umhlanga Halls, one of them being the ongoing choice to segregate
oneself from the rest of society. Drawing on Caldeira (1999), fortified enclaves represent a
new alternative for the urban life of the middle and upper classes. As such they are codified as
something conferring high status. The construction of status symbols is a process that
elaborates social distance and creates means for the assertion of social difference and
inequality. As such, the image that confers the higher status and is most seductive is that of an
enclosed and isolated community, a secure environment in which one can use various
facilities and services and live only among 'equals'. The advertisements of those luxury
communities present the image of islands to which one can return every day, in order to
escape from the city and its deteriorated environment and to encounter an exclusive world of
pleasure among peers. The image of the enclaves, therefore, is opposed to the image of the
city as a deteriorated world pervaded by not only pollution and noise but, more importantly,
confusion and mixture, that is, social heterogeneity (Caldeira, 1999)
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Another important issue that is raised is Bilkis's inherent class-consciousness. Social wealth
in the context of the suburban South Africa is not only about race, but is a class position and
normative concept. Social wealth is measured by a person's "cultural capital" - that is, the
accessibility of things such as higher education and social graces, vocabulary, and demeanour
that allow one to prosper or at least compete within the dominant culture. It is also a sense of
entitlement to certain privileges that are out of the reach of others. This upper-class social
wealth is defined as much by mainstream acceptance of norms, values, and life expectations
as by race or ethnicity (Low, 2003). Seemingly insignificant comments like "I live in the
servants' quarters" are insightful anecdotes about how humour obscure social tensions and
become the mechanism for determining one's views and political leanings as well. As the
conversation progresses, Bilkis's comments about people living in Chatsworth become
indicators of where she stands in relation to a number of cultural and social views. Her
comments are also indicators of her habitus and cultural capital. I cannot help but think that
by subjugating herself as living in "servants' quarters" Bilkis was unconsciously seeking to
get reassurance of her social position from me, as she knew I would react and deny the
remotest possibility of community being servants' quarters-like. That particular comment
also leads to issues of differences between the two opposing communities as well; the
difference between the 'nouveau riches', like herself, and the established rich like Aisha, as
well as the inherent the tensions involved there.
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Aisha's car
Aisha is a tall woman, in her mid forties. She has bony but strong facial features and shows
signs of affluence by the stylish clothes she wears and the conspicuous diamond rings she
wears on her fingers . She smiles hesitantly and invites me in her huge two-storey house
almost reluctantly.
"I am sorry for not being able to talk to you for long, but I have to fetch my kids from
madrasah infifteen minutes. You can accompany me in the car ifyou want. I don 't let my kids
walk on the streets by themselves although the madrasah is just down the road. ] ask her the
reasonfor this and she replies that she doesn't want them to meet all kinds ofstrange people
because it's dangerous. Besides, we have a car, there 's no reason for which we shouldn 't use
it!"
We chat for a short while. Aisha tells me that she married a poor man although she came
from a rich family. Her parents helped Faizel with his job, giving him the capital to start his
own business. Now they are prospering in wealth and have two children. They have been
living on the Ridge for almost five years.
"I like living on the Ridge. ] wouldn't want to live anywhere else. ] mean where else could]
possibly go anyway? There's no other decent and safe place in Durban. Besides all my
friends living around here, so there 's no point in me leaving this place. Faizel and] have
considered moving abroad, but then we decided against it. ] like it here, we have a good life
and] don 't want to have to start all over again in a strangeplace ".
A few minutes later, ] bid Aisha goodbye and decline her offer to accompany her to the
madrasah. ] get a sense ofreluctance around this woman and] do not want to push my luck.
My short conversation with Aisha proves to be very enlightening in unpacking the dynamics
ofhow upper class Muslims in Umhlanga view places that they are accustomed to. On the one
hand the new residential enclaves of the upper classes, associated with shopping malls,
isolated complexes, and other privately controlled environments represent a new form of
organizing social differences and creating segregation in Durban and many other cities around
the world. As a result, public streets become spaces in which the elite circulate by car and
poor people circulate on foot or by public transportation. To walk on the public street is
becoming a sign of class in many cities, an activity that the elite is abandoning. However,
despite this tendency to look at social reality as the direct product of elite intentions, Davis
(1992) elaborates a remarkable critique of social and spatial segregation and associates the
emerging urban configuration with the crucial themes of social inequality and political
options. For him, not only is there nothing inevitable about "fortress architecture", but also it
has, in fact, deep consequences for the way in which public space and public interactions are
shaped. People attach meanings to the spaces where they live in flexible and varying ways,
and the factors influencing these readings and uses are endless. However, cities are also
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material spaces with relative stability and rigidity .that shape and bound peoples ' lives and
determine the types of encounters possible in public space. When walls are built up, they form
the stage for public life regardless of the meanings people attach to them and regardless of the
multiple "tactics" of resistance people use to appropriate space (Davis, 1992).
On the other hand, Aisha's reluctance to immigrate and 'start all over again in a strange place'
reflects the comfort zone, which she has appropriated for herself and her family. Her
unwillingness to move does not arise out of financial concerns , but rather out of fear of
having to start from scratch. The status that she has acquired over years of living in affluence
before and after she got married will be hard to establish again in a new place.
The second issue that Aisha raises by her refusal to detach herself from her 'friends' is the
consequences of this segregation for the Muslim Ummah? If the Ummah itself is a
representative of the symbolic belonging to a larger Muslim community, then the caste
divisions which pertain within the Muslim community in Durban is in direct contradiction to
what the Ummah proposes. The caste divisions amongst the Sunni Sufis and the Tablighi
Jamaat, which arises out of diasporic attachment to India and the social divisions prevailing
there, contradicts the very core of the Islamic belief. In Islam, caste and class do not exist and
do no matter since all Muslims, irrespective of their social status belong to a 'brotherhood'
epitomised by the Ummah. The divisions occurring amongst Muslims in Durban and the
deliberate spatial separation, which masks itself under pretexts around safety, property value,
niceness etc. illustrate how the affluent Muslims, especially those of the Tablighi Jamaat,
choose to re-fashion this understanding of the Ummah to suit their own purposes. Cultural
capital takes precedence over the belief of equality on many levels. Caste, class and race
consciousness become important markers of this community's identity.
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The Taalim
It is a solemn atmosphere. We are about ten women sitting on a mat that has been laid on the
clean marbled floor of Zaynab 's house. I flip through the pages of the book that has been
handed over to me. The book is without a doubt promoting the Tabliqui Jamaat ideology. I am
uneasy; I have never liked gatherings of this sort. The women around me are all dressed in
beautifully embroidered jilbabs. Underneath their garbs, I can see their jeans, high-heeled
shoes, and gold bracelets. Although all of them are middle-aged, they all have carefully
manicured hands, wear flashy diamonds on their fingers and their athletic bodies suggest
regular visits to the gym. Needless to mention, they all arrived in BMWs and have the latest
cell-phones, some ofwhich ring during the congregational readings. The explicit markers of
cultural capital ranging from the enormous houses and their accompanying BMW cars
parked in front of doorways or in garages, to the glittering diamond rings adorning the
women's fingers are all signs ofluxury and habitus.
The reading starts. Tasneem, one of the richest of the lot, asks me to read. I read and make
the fatal mistake ofdaring to question what is written in one ofthe books. The women are not
happy about my question at all and I get a curt reply about my mistake in questioning the
book. Whatever is in the book should not be questioned I'm told.
One woman in particular, Dilshad, seems to lead the whole reading Taalim. She is the one
who does the speeches, reads by heart, while everyone else listens to her. She also cautions
everyone in the audience to be humble, to be generous in giving to the poor and to avoid
being flashy about one's riches. Occasionally, Tasneem's cell-phone rings and she proceeds
to take the calls, chatting away in front of everyone. Tasneem, I'm told later by the other
women, 'came with the money '. She married a middle-class man and made him what he is
today - a rich one. Tasneem is also the one who has the most issues with the other members
of the community as well as with the Imam. However, all the other women remain 'friends'
with her, she is highly regarded in the community because ofher status.
The Taalim ends. I am formally introduced to everyone as the Mauritian student who is
studying 'rich Muslims ' in Durban! While most of the women just smile and say hello,
Dilshad on the other hand, engages more and asks me questions about my background, what
I'm studying and even invites me to her house for lunch. She also tells me that she and her
husband often organize Jamaat groups, which travel all over the world to propagate Islam.
Her charisma and passionate character makes a huge impact on me.
Identity markers: Hierarchy, Women, religion and the veil.
My experience with the Taalim proved to be very instructive in unpacking the hierarchy
prevalent amongst the women residing in Umhlanga Halls. Although the women are or more
or less the same economic status, it is Dilshad in particular who comes across as the one who
maintains discipline in the group. Another interesting factor is the tensions present amongst
the well established rich families, characterized by Tasneem's outward self-confidence in
breaking the flow of things, and the nouveau riche, characterized by the other women's
obedience to Dilshad's summons. Another interesting factor is the dialectic between the
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acceptances of western values of materialism, revealed by the clothing labels and expensive
cars, and the values of humility being promoted during the readings.
One of the main identity markers of the Muslim women of Umhlanga Halls is the wearing of
the hijab. As Hall (2000) argues, identity is maintained through social and material
conditions . If a group is symbolically marked as the enemy or as taboo, that will have real
effects because the group will be socially excluded and materially disadvantaged. Ironically,
while the ruling of the Tablighi Jamiat is that women should cover their hair, the Sunni
Ulema Council , whose main support lies amongst working class Muslims, is far less strict on
matters of dress codes (Vabed, 2000). It seems that the more affluent classes have embraced
the veil/hijab in greater numbers. Paradoxically, the same hijab has become a passport for
freedom for the Muslim women living in affluent families. This is characterized by the
women's freedom to move around in shopping malls, surfing competitions, flea markets and
so on. The wearing of designer clothing and jewellery such as Cats shoes and Nike T-shirts ,
the carrying of cellular phones and the driving of luxury cars also accompany the embracing
of the cloak and veil. The women of Umhlanga Halls freely embrace all the benefits of
modem Western technology, without seeing the contradictions involved in their actions. The
women's prominent participation in religious public arenas, in an attempt to propagate
Islamic values amongst themselves and to their children through Taalims and Tablighs for
example, is another feature of women's roles in affluent societies. Muslims attempting to
grapple with the questions posed by modernity and social diversity feel a sense of
vulnerability and weakness in the face of these challenges and have found strength in Islam as
a source of stability and identity. More and more Muslims are holding on to a 'system of
beliefs and practices that treat scriptural absolutism as the way to counter the pluralism and
relativism engendered by modernity (Vahed, 2000). While Islam, on the one hand, has
become one of the cores of their identity; ethnicity, language, class and regionalism still
remain issues of contention amongst them.
Indeed, according to Hall & Held (1990:175), 'from the ancient world to the present day,
citizenship has entailed a discussion, and a struggle, over the meaning and scope of
membership of the community in which one lives'. Therefore, ontological commitments to
race or ethnicity, far from being denied, should be placed in the richer context of these
identity markers. In addition, 'ethnicity cannot be divorced form other changes of the 20th
century: urbanization, communication networks, new relationships of production, the increase
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in migratory, and, commercial movements (Maxted & Zegeye, 1997). These communities
provide an apt focus for understanding the variegated ways in which Muslims in particular
localities have been negotiating the unfolding post apartheid democratic landscape. They are
an expression of a confluence of global and local Islamization discourses, mediated by
changing discursive and material circumstances. The communities can be regarded as a
response to moral anxieties experienced by communities after 1994. The protagonists of these
communities have chosen 'splendid isolation' as a means ofproducing moral propriety among
the community. A spirit of self-help, ideologically produced during mosque sermons, through
the mobilizing role of the Imam serves to galvanise members around the need to retain
communal cohesion and support. These mosque-based ideologies play a central role in
reproducing a discourse that distances their adherents from the surrounding community. Their
mode of action is thus based on a desire to establish a relatively isolated identity insulated
from external influences and processes.
Another crucial point that arises out of this gathering is the female diasporic experience. The
activism, which Dilshad displays, reveals clearly how the local micro politics of the diasporic
public sphere come to be intertwined with transnational diasporic political activism. It is
noteworthy that women in general have been very active in transnational movements, either
on their own or in alliance with men (Sayyid, 2003). In transcending a possible construction
of their local identity as 'victims' - as a doubly oppressed racialised minority women's group -
the South African Muslim women I studied are very active in redefining their social
positioning not only in South Africa but also globally and transnationally. By travelling in
Tablighi congregations to other parts of South Africa, Mauritius and Fiji, amongst other
countries (countries where Indian diasporas are present), they are rewriting the political and
religious terms of their citizenship - from passive to active, from the private sphere to the
public sphere, from racialised minority to an elite cadre of global citizens seeking to
propagate Islam in their understanding; the Tablighi ideology. One of the ways in which they
try to achieve this is the building of the pre-school at the mosque and through the regular
Taalims they hold in Umhlanga. However, while on the one hand their intentions are genuine
and heartfelt, their choice of segregation contradicts their very actions. This process of
playing on multiple citizenships, Muslim but of the Tablighi School coming from Mehmon
and Gujarati decent, is what typifies contemporary diasporas and makes the chaorder they
represent quite different from that of earlier, pre-national diasporas.
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Imran - The 'new' South African debate - race. class and caste.
Imran" is a short stout man ofblack origin. He is dressed in simple clothes, clothes that have
no doubt been worn over and over again. His manner is shy and he is obviously surprised by
my willingness to talk to him. I am not sure if it is because ofmy gender or just because he is
associating me with one of the community residents. I introduce myself and he shrugs his
shoulders indifferently saying that he can spare me afew minutes.
"I'm a Masters student at the University ofNatal-Natal and I am doing some research on
Muslim residents in gated communities, well let 's say rich areas like Umhlanga and since you
know the people who come to the mosque, I thought it would be a good idea to talk to you ".
As the conversation progresses, he starts to warm up towards me. His manner changes totally
when I tell him that I'm from Mauritius. He smiles immediately and opens up. Is it my identity
as an outsider that makes him less wary ofme? Probably yes. The remaining transcripts are
pieces ofconversation between Imran and L
Imran : "You know most Muslims living in Umhlanga are rich, that is what makes them think
that they can behave as they wish. Sometimes they are rude to me, but most ofthe times, they
do not even have long conversations with us. There are a few black men that come to the
mosque, especially on Fridays for Jummah , but the black men stick together and the Indians
do too. There are also a few white Muslims that come, and many people from outside, those
who do not live in Umhlanga but who work here ".
Me: Who comes to the mosque? I mean in terms ofSunni Sufis and Tablighi Jamaat? Does
everyone use the same mosque?
Imran: "Yes everyone uses the same mosque, but sometimes I am embarrassed. The two sides
accuse me of not giving them enough attention and they have some issues amongst
themselves. Both groups complain that I favour the other side, but I'm only the Imam here,
and they pay me, I cannot say anything, I have to do things as they wish. I'm a poor man after
all and I have to think ofmy family ".
Me: What about the women? Do you get along well with them?
Imran: "Some women I talk to. Most don 't talk to me. I think someone should talk to them
about wearing the jilbaab. Many come to fetch their children from the pre-school and they
come wearing tight jeans, it's a lack ofrespect. I don't like some ofthe women, they treat me
as if I'm invisible".
Surprisingly, the interview takes an unexpected turn when Imran starts asking me questions.
(i) "How do you think we can make the people, especially the women living in Umhlanga
come to the mosque more often for prayer? " (ii) "What is your advice on how we can make
the men come together and stop squabbling about issues such as caste/schools of thought? "
(iii) "Who can tell the women to dress more appropriately when they come to mosque to fetch
their kids? "
37 Imran is the Imam from Malawi. The committee , which has helped build the Mosque, employs him under a
contractual basis. His family is in Malawi and he goes back to his home a few times during the year.
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Forty-five minutes later, I leave Imran with my phone number. The meeting had turned out to
be an eye-opener.
My conversation with Imran highlights an important factor informing Muslims identities in
the 'new' South Africa. Hall (2000) has pointed out that identities are not unified. There are
often contradictions within them, which, have to be negotiated. For example, the black
Muslims' ideologies may be religiously similar to that of the Indian Muslims' , but culturally
different in fundamental ways. The fact that identity is relational, and difference is established
by symbolic marking in relation to others (Hall, 2000), the process of identity making is
therefore an ongoing process. Imran sees himself as an Imam, someone who is supposed to
have authority over the rest of the community by virtue of his religious status. However,
because of his economic and racial status, he is not allowed by members frequenting the
mosque to affirm his identity as a figure of authority. He therefore chooses to adopt the same
identity that many other disadvantaged South African black people have. This almost 'forced'
repressed identity reiterates the class dynamics prevalent within the Muslim community.
Imran's own identity is largely attributed to racist ideology amongst Indians and Blacks.
Racism has been shown to be a contributor to patterns of urban and suburban separation and
exclusion in South Africa (Vahed, 2000). Even though Apartheid has ended, cities, such as
the greater Durban area, continue to experience high levels of residential segregation based on
discriminatory real estate practices and mortgage structures designed to insulate whites and
Indians from blacks (2000). Blacks are less likely to move to the suburbs in the first place,
and then more likely to return to the city. Residential proximity to blacks intensified fears of
crime and those who are racially prejudiced are even more fearful. However the fear factor is
not the only cause of Imran's subjugation by the Muslim community. The condescending
manner with which he is treated by the men and women indicate signs the racist belief that
'black is inferior'. The Imam is not allowed to assume the social and religious status, which
he is entitled to by virtue of his race. Things might have been different is the Imam was a rich
Indian man.
Furthermore, the mosque 's failure in bringing about a united Muslim community in
Umhlanga is typified by the internal clashes that occur amongst the Sunni Sufis and the
Tablighi Jamaat groups. Ironically, whereas the mosque was initially built under the premise
that everyone would use it, it has turned out to be a source of conflict amongst the Muslims
68
residing in Umhlanga, conflict arising out of caste differences. Furthermore, the lack of
interaction and integration amongst black and Indian Muslims in the mosque once again
highlight race consciousness and demarcation permeating in this community. In many ways,
the mosque is a reflection of the Muslim community in terms of its sub-groups, as it is in
Durban. Built with the capital of the rich, it is mostly used as a ground for the imposition of
the upper class's ideologies and beliefs.
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The Case ofUmhlanga Crest
I smile to myself. I am used to this scenery by now ... the big houses, the golf course, and the
cleanliness.... Today I'm going to meet Shameema. She lives in a gated condominium very
much like Umhlanga Halls. I jump out ofthe bus and walk towards the gated area. The layout
of the community is outstanding in neatness. All the houses are arranged in a parallel
manner, green-roofed and similar gardens. I reach the front gate, it is slightly open and the
security guard is nowhere to be found. Intrigued by the absence of the guard, I buzz
Shameema's house number. A few minutes later, the security guard appears, and asks me to
come in, without checking my identity card and no questions asked.
Shameema's maid meets me at the front door. Her house exhibits an air ofclassy minimalism,
few ornaments, yet beautifully set up. I sit on the leather couch and wait for her. A few
minutes later, she comes wearing a bathrobe. Shameema is in her early thirties, has short
black hair and is easy-going. I like her immediately. We chat a bit and she shows me some of
the books that the women use for the Taalim, apologizing for leaving me alone as she goes to
get dressed.
When she comes back from her room, we talk about her reasons for moving to Somerset Park.
"I have been making duahs for a long time to find a nice and safe place to live since I got my
kids. Alhamdullilah I found this place. I like it here although the property was slightly
expensive, but it was worth it. I mean it is safe here and you have all the peace and quiet that
you want. Nobody interferes in your affairs. You can still have social life, through the Taalims
and you also meet the other women at the gym sometimes. Besides it is near my husband's
place ofwork, so it's suitable ".
"It is pretty here, I like it. It is very pretty. You know these days you have to move in safe
areas, you cannot afford to live in places where everyone else is coming to buy houses. It's
not easy these days ".
When I tell her about the guard 's absence at the front gate, she says, "Yeah I know I have to
tell my husband to report him. These guards are not always there, it's annoying because it
makes the place unsafe. You might think you're safe all the time ... but when the guards are
slack, you never know who might come in".
Dualistic thinking is a form of social splitting used to cope with anxiety and fear. It
oversimplifies and dichotomises cultural definitions and social expectations to differentiate
the self from the other. Psychological splitting, as by Melanie Klein's (1975) argument, can
be used as a form of denial and resistance, providing a means of distancing oneself from a
undesirable self-image and projecting it onto another. Social splitting is often used to project
social fears onto a more vulnerable group. The advertisements for gated communities evoke
this social splitting and even go a step further by envisaging what is being defended against,
thereby reinforcing the reverse process that designates those living outside the walls as being
outsiders (Low, 2003).
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Shameema's annoyance at the guard's lack of vigilance highlights her fear of crime but also
the fear of privacy invasion. The connection between a place and a person also resides in
symbolic meanings of the landscape. When these symbols are threatened, as with the crime
rates in South Africa, place-protective behaviours occur. Indeed, the cultural markers of the
fear throughout South Africa in the form or razor wire and high walls surrounding residences
are obvious everywhere in the condominium she lives in as well as in Umhlanga Halls. They
are represented in the numerous security companies' 'Armed Response' notices that
'decorate' closed gates and are emblazoned on patrol cars that outnumber local police. The
culture of fear manifests its largest indicator of cultural capital in the development of gated
community environments such as Urnhlanga Halls (During ton, 2004). Yet, residents claim
that those communities are merely retirement homes, or spacious environments, of cleaner
areas - anything that what they really are. While this conversation supports the cultural
disposition that informs the habitus referred to earlier (a fear of crime as rationalization for
moving to a gated community), the conversation also flushes out the larger issue of what
residents call "forced removal" (2004). Such allegations are not only destructive to the
process of creating a 'new' rainbow South Africa, but, are also ideologically laden and
culturally loaded considering the socio-political history of South Africa (2004).
Another interesting factor is the issue of niceness. Shameema reiterates her likeness of a
'nice' and 'pretty' environment even though the property she bought was rather expensive.
Constance Perin (1977), a cultural anthropologist who writes about peoples' need to live in
'nice' and 'neat' environments argues that all land use practices, planning, and zoning are
value laden. They act as moral codes for unstated rules governing what are widely regarded as
correct social categories and relationships (Low, 2003). Image and investment, along with
safety and hassle-free living, are what many gated community residents look for (Low, 2003).
The aesthetic control of the landscape is one strategy by which 'niceness' is expressed and
used to mark a residential development and the people within it as upper class. Elite families




Suraya 's house is probably the biggest one I have seen since I started my fieldwork. Located
on the Ridge, as residents of Umhlanga Crest call it, her property gate opens up on a
beautiful fountain, surrounded by greens and ferns. The rather long path leading up to the
front door is paved with white marbled tiles and as I enter the lobby, I cannot help but admire
the perfection with which the house is adorned. Suraya is in her mid-fifties, and her quiet
manner displays signs of tiredness. Somehow she looks rather preoccupied. I greet her and
introduce myself.
"I am not sure what kind ofinformation you're lookingfor but I'll try to help you in any way I
"can .
I thank her and start chatting. She tells me that she has been victim ofsome horrible crime
and that she does not feel safe anymore because ofwhat happened.
"You know when you are rich and you live in a place like that, people take advantage ofyou.
Even people you think you know they are the ones that you cannot trust the most. You never
know what's on their minds, and to think that they work for you! They are jealous of us. I
came to live here because I wanted my children to be safe, just like we were when we were
kids. Although we had to live in specific areas, at least we knew we could be safe. Now I don't
know what to do anymore. I am disturbed by what happened to my family and I can ever stop
worrying, especially for my children ".
"We have more alarms since this thing happened, we have employed security personnel and I
have told my children to always carry their cell-phones with them in case they need to contact
us urgently".
She starts crying. She is obviously disturbed by the event that took place in her house and sees
it as a violation ofher rights. I smile, thank herfor her time and leave the huge house.
Low (2003) argues that one of the most common reasons for the choice of living in gated
communities is residents' desire to re-create a childhood place with the feelings of emotional
security and protection of childhood. Gated community residents want to recapture physical
elements of their childhood landscapes, just like other people, but this desire is entangled with
an unconscious longing for security they identify with living behind gates and walls, by being
protected. Even though people grow up in the same place and time, they live in their own
psychological worlds and perceptual environments. Different aspects of a place become
emotionally salient. The same is true for re-creating the past - only fragments and defining
moments of a childhood landscape survive for each person - but these memories are powerful
and influence preferences about where to live and how. The link between emotional security
and the built environment is forged in a number of ways. Enlarging Marcus's (1976) idea that
home is a symbol of self to encompass the house and its physical surroundings, gated
communities provide another layer of symbolic identification by adding a boundary created
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by gates, walls and guards. The social impact of gating provides the same paradox. The
degree of control restricts participation and limits aspects of interaction and struggle
important to furthering local democracy. Suraya's wish to regain the security that she felt
when she was younger exemplifies her unconscious aspiration to live in a place in which she
can be distanced from 'others' that she does not 'trust' so that she and her children can be
safe. The event that took place in her home has only served to reinforce her fear of invasion
and lack on control over it.
One explanation for the gated community's popularity is that it materially and metaphorically
incorporates otherwise conflicting, and in some cases polarized, social values that make up
the moral terrain of upper-class life. For example, it reflects urban and suburban tensions in
the 'new' South Africa regarding social class, race and ethnicity and at the same time
represents the perennial concern with creating community. The gated community's symbolic
power rests on its ability to order personal and social experience. Architectural symbols such
as gates and walls also provide a rationale for the moral inconsistencies of everyday life. For
instance, many residents want to feel safe in their homes and argue that walls and gates help
keep criminals out, even in areas such as Umhlanga where crime rates are the lowest in
Durban. Living in a gated community represents a new version of the upper-middle class
South African dream precisely because it temporarily suppressed and masks, even denies and
fuses, the inherent anxieties and conflicting social values of modern urban and suburban life.
It transforms South Africans' and especially Muslims' dilemma of how to protect themselves
and their children from danger, crime, and un-Islamic influences by reinforcing the norms of
the upper-middle class lifestyle in a historically segregated urban environment (Low, 2003).
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The end
This is my last field note entry. I would like to believe that I have been to deconstruct the
reasons for which Muslims choose to live in gated communities. Ofcourse I have managed to
scratch only the first surface layer. The Muslim women with who I worked with have chosen
to segregate themselves behind walls for a particular reason, and they know it. I wonder
whether they admit it to themselves. Has any ofthem ever asked themselves what the point of
holding Taalims promoting togetherness and belonging is, when they choose keep up
boundaries between themselves and others? Has Apartheid not taught them to realise how
spatial segregation can be harmful to the bigger society?
It is not my place to judge although my findings make me uneasy. I don't really like what I
discovered as I'm aware of the negative implications involved in spatial segregation. But I
would lie to you and to myself ifI said that I would never have considered living in a gated
community. On the one hand I have thought about this for a long time. I have wondered how
it would be like to live in those wonderfully clean, spacious and meticulously groomed
environments. And on the other hand, I understand the rationale of the need to create and
sustain a non-segregated society since I've lived in this country for 5 years now. I understand
the implications ofmy own understanding ofthe Ummah and how it contradicts the very logic
ofseparating oneselffrom others. But I also know that deep inside ofmyselfI want and aspire
to raise myselfto the upper-middle class section ofsociety.
As I leave Umhlanga Halls for the last time, gazing at the 'perfect' life I've always aspired, I
smile in retrospect. The choice to live in a gated community, especially for a Muslim who




As argued in Chapter 3, globalization and economic restructuring weaken existing social
relations and contribute to the breakdown of traditional ways of maintaining social order.
Social control mechanisms and their associated institutions, such as the police and schools,
are no longer seen as effective. This breakdown in local control threatens some neighborhood
residents, and the gated residential community becomes a viable and socially acceptable
option. The creation of gated communities (and the addition of guard houses, walls, and
entrance gates to established neighborhoods) is an integral part of the building of the fortress
city, a social control teclmique based on the so-called militarization of the city. In South
Africa, it is a strategy for regulating and patrolling an urban poor comprised predominantly of
black people living in townships.
Furthermore, crucial to the analysis of identity (as well as any encounters that occur) in
contemporary southern Africa is the complex and ubiquitous process of globalisation. The
term 'globalisation' is described not only as the space-time compression of the world, but also
as an intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole (Robertson, 1992). As
discussed in Chapter 3, globalisation does not entail the elimination of space, but rather its
transformation, the creation of a system where increasing areas are linked through new
technology, but certain nodal points where power is centralised, are strengthened (Mosco,
1996: 205). Within such a globalised system, the global order's centres are no longer the
capitals ofnation-states but rather "pulse points of complex networks" (Comaroff, 1996: 172).
In Abu-Lughod's (1991) words, one gains a sense of 'multiple cores' (1991: 131). In the
cultural study of identity, Lawrence Grossberg (1996) replaces the logic of temporality, which
emphasises the acquisition of new identities through time, with one of spatiality. He states,
"Subjectivity as spatial... involves taking literally the statement that people experience the
world from a particular position" (Grossberg, 1996: 100). The politics of space is vital to the
process of globalisation and identity construction. It is especially relevant to the Umhlanga
Halls and Umhlanga Crest residents' situation. The link between living a Muslim life
whereby every other person is considered to be equal and the need to affirm one's own
identity in terms of one's social background, leads Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest
residents to use their diasporic attachments of the Indian caste system as a pretext to join the
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race for capitalist gain and support. This is demonstrated through, on the one hand, their
practice of preaching Islam during the Taalims and, on the other, and their refusal to integrate
with the Muslims of Sunni Sufi origin.
Although the greater Durban area is not as big as global cities like Los Angeles or London, its
people are very scattered and differentiated along lines of class and race, as illustrated by the
obvious dialectical disparities manifesting in the urban geography. As such, Geertz (1973)
underscored how contemporary people who live in close proximity often do not share a
common culture, but instead interact with people who are dispersed, resulting in an
increasingly interconnected world: ''we are trying to find our field in a seriously scrambled
world that does not divide itself cleanly at the joints into societies or traditions ...such
identities escape in part from either-or classification and become defined more by a logic of
'both-and-and' in which the subject shares partial overlapping identities with other similarly
constituted decentred subjects that inhabit reticular social forms" (Kearney, 1995:558). In
other words, remoteness in the global context does not mean exclusion from global political,
economic, social and cultural networks, although in Africa, it might well coincide with
subordination. Global social interaction is perhaps less active in Umhlanga Halls and
Umhlanga Crest and therefore they have potentially less agency. The new technology of
communication is lauded as providing new and unlimited possibilities of access to people
from different temporal and spatial zones to the 'joys' of the modern world. The greater
potential, which it offers is countered with the reality that this will not be available to all,
especially in the 'new' South Africa.
Furthermore, Bilkis, Zaynab, Aisha, and all the other women living in Umhlanga Halls and
Umhlanga Crest illustrate how important place identity and place attachment can be when
making decisions about where to live. Questions of "who we are" often relate to "where we
live" because place is such an important component of how people define themselves. Low
(2003) argues that place identity figures prominently in determining where a person lives, and
contributes to feelings of satisfaction and a sense of security. A component ofplace identity is
"place attachment" - the social, psychological, and cultural bond that forms between
individuals or groups and their environment. Place attachment developed over time through
personal experience and through cultural habitus. Those experiences could include factors
such as living in a particular location, buying or decorating a home, telling stories about a
particular landscape, and learning about religious or cultural importance of a site all
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contribute to sense of place attachment (Low, 2003). Place attachment is also developed from
cultural capital. The example of Bilkis's disdain for other Muslims of lower social class than
hers demonstrates her inability to relate to 'these people' through her social upbringing. As a
result, in order to differentiate herself from 'these people', she chooses to live in a place that
she knows they cannot 'infiltrate' by virtue of ' their' economic 'disadvantage' .
The Municipality and urban sustainability
As far as the eThekwini Municipality's plan to create an integrated Durban area is concerned,
geographic and demographic factors point to its potential failure in those regards. Developers
such as Moreland and others are continuing on their mission to create a Northern Durban,
which is technologically friendly, architecturally safe and aesthetically appealing to a small
upper-class segment of the Durban population. At the present moment, current land use
management in the eThekwini area is fraught by institutional fragmentation. Different parts of
the Durban area are managed through different legislation, authorities, procedures and plans.
Delivery of the land use management service is fragmented. Some areas of Durban are
covered by complex formal systems of land use management, while others have no land use
management system at all (eThekwini Municipality, 2003). Municipal officers' claims that
the Mayor intends to distribute ten percent of the Durban North to the poorer classes neither
shows any sign of concretisation, nor any sign that such a plan could work. The urban and
economic pattern of Umhlanga is tailored for an elite class by virtue of its housing schemes,
business enterprises, property values, and distance to 'downtown'. Heterotopic environments
do not suit the lower classes that cannot afford the luxury of embellishing their housing
situations.
Consequences of gated community developments
As established throughout this study, gated community developments have many
consequences on the urban landscape but also on the social landscape. The combination of the
four main social trends that gated community developments reflect, namely segregation in
search for stability and control of the neighbourhood; privatisation; militarization (that is,
private armament); and architectural separation (Bremner, 1998; CSIR, 2000) is determining
the development of the contemporary South African urban landscape. Not all of these
processes are new: the wish, or the thrust, for segregation can be linked to the apartheid
experience. An entirely new aspect, however, is that of the state or the municipality becoming
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redundant for certain functions such as the preservation of law and order, and the maintenance
of infrastructure.
One of the consequences of the increased development of gated communities is the loss of a
liveable urban centre. The upper classes are not attracted to the 'grimy' downtown of Durban
with its small-scale office parks, narrow asymmetrical streets and run down infrastructure.
As a result, they opt for spatial fragmentation and segregation, which immediately comes
evident due to the scale of intervention. It also starts to exclude potential users from
previously or current public open spaces or facilities. They may contribute to safer
environments, but also to many social divisions in cities. Privatisation is also another
consequence. In cities fragmented by fortified enclaves it is difficult to maintain the principles
of openness and free circulation that are the most significant organizing values of modem
cities. As a result, the character of public space and of citizens' participation in public life
changes. A new aesthetic of security shapes all types of constructions and imposes its new
logic of surveillance and distance as a means for displaying status (Low, 1999), and it is
changing the character of public life and public interaction. Among the diverse elements
changing the city, the new enclaves for residence, work, and consumption of the upper classes
are provoking the deepest transformations. Although they have different uses and many
specializations (some for residence, others for work, leisure, or consumption), all types of
fortified enclaves share some basic characteristics. They are privatised property for collective
use; they are physically isolated, either by walls or empty spaces or other design devices; they
are turned inward and not to the street; and they are controlled by armed guards and security
systems that enforce rules of inclusion and exclusion. (Caldeira, 1999, in Low, 1999).
Another huge consequence ofgating has been the huge influence ofproperty prices all around
South Africa. Prices depend on the extent on security measures. At the present moment, a
detached one-storey house in Umhlanga Crest is selling from R 2 million upwards. In prestige
communities in particular, where security and lifestyle are two sides of the same coin, land
and house prices have multiplied (Roberts 1996). Particularly for the white and black middle
class, for the first time homeowners, and for single-person households who flee urban blight
and inner-city flats, gated communities are becoming the most important housing alternative
in 'desirable areas' (Cohen 1998). As such architectural separation has come to fore. Many,
such as Davis (1992), have noted how peoples' obsession with security has transformed urban
regions into literal fortresses. This shift is most often than not manifested in the physical
78
dissemination of city space, which is divided into fortified cells of affluence and places of
terror where police battle the criminalized poor. A common feature of closed condominiums
is isolation and distance from the city, a fact that is presented as offering the possibility of a
better lifestyle. The latter is expressed, for example, by the location of the development in
"nature" (green parks, lakes etc.), and in the use of phrases inspired by ecological discourses.
However, it is clear in the advertisements that isolation means separation from those
considered to be socially inferior, and that the key factor to assure this is security. This means
fences and walls surrounding the condominium, guards on duty 24 hours a day controlling the
entrances, and an array of facilities and services to ensure security. In other words, this area
clearly represents the new trend of movement of wealthy residents as well as services and
commerce to the periphery of the city and to enclosed areas.
Identities of resistance
Could the choice to live in gated communities be acts of resistance emerging from identities
of resistance? Pile & Keith (1997) suggest that the spatial practices of resistance are not just
the mobilization of a class across space, nor the mobilization of an interest group in a
particular place, but about insinuation. Thus, resistance, then, not only takes place in place,
but also seeks to appropriate space, to make new spaces (1997). As argued earlier, identities
of resistance stem from previous acts of domination or subjugation, which are more and less
obviously political, and political identities have been closely associated with the politics of
resistance. However, Fanon's (1986) work for instance proposes that a recognition that
political identities are not just made out of siding either with the oppressor or against the
oppressor. Subjectivities are about feelings - fears, desires, repulsions - which are not so
easily contained within a narrowly structural analysis of politics. The dialectic of
repositioning is fought not only in overt political spaces, not only through self-consciously
manipulated deceits, but also in inner spaces too, as is characterized in the Taalims held in
Umhlanga Halls. Fanon's argument that it may be necessary to overcome resistance in order
to achieve resistance, tallies well with the Taalim being overtly against any potential Sufi
Sunni ideological endorsement. "The colonized must conquer parts of themselves in order to
liberate themselves" (Fanon, 1986); that is, power colonizes internally as well as externally,
and achieving the overthrow of external power is more easily conceived of than the idea of
shedding the guilt and shame induced by internal colonization, as had happened during
Apartheid. Political resistance seeks to overthrow the perceived dangers in the practices of the
powerful, while psychic resistance seeks unconsciously to maintain the repression in of
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traumatic or potentially dangerous memories, feelings, or impulses. Having been previously
'colonised' by the Apartheid government, both on a political and spatial level , the
predominantly Tablighi Muslims living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest may be
projecting the same pattern upon less Sunni Sufis and those of a less economically advantaged
Muslim community.
Accordingly, it becomes clear that spatialities are constitutive not only of domination, but also
of resistance"; that struggles for power are spatialised and constituted in space in specific
ways - from opposition to repositioning; that power relations intersect in specific ways, that
resistance in one direction can be oppression in another, and that resistance occurs in spaces
beyond those defined by power relations ; that acts of resistance have to be understood not
only in terms of their location in power relations but also through their intended and received
meanings (Pile & Keith, 1997). Pile & Keith (1997) argue that political subjectivities are
constituted through political struggles, but also that there are many spaces of struggle through
which people become political. The effects of these geographies of resistance are multiple,
fluid, dynamic and in some ways uncontainable or at least unintended. The material effects of
power are physically and literally everywhere in Umhlanga Halls. It matters that power seems
to be everywhere, but wherever one looks, the same power is open to gaps, inconsistencies,
ambivalences, possibilities for inversion, parody and so on; open, that is, to more than one
geography of resistance, as characterized by the social tensions inherent amongst those living
in Umhlanga Halls and those living in Umhlanga Crest.
38 It has been a key feature of the arguments presented that resistance is analysed and theorized as a diagnosis
of, and a reaction to, the injurious effects of power relations, although the idea that resistance is merely an
oppositional stance has been interrupted by a sense that political identities are strategic , tactical, mobile,
multifaceted, blurred, awkward, ambivalent. Further, once passive, inert and singular notions of spatiality and
identity are abandoned, then it becomes clear that resistance is as much defined through the struggle to define
liberation, space and subjectivity as through the elite 's attempts to defeat, prevent and oppress those who
threaten their authority. At the heart of questions of resistance lie questions of spatiality - the politics of lived
spaces. The politics of location involves not only a sense of where one is in the world - a sense gained from the
experiences ofhistory , geography, culture, self and imagination - mapped through the simultaneously spatial and
temporal interconnections between people, but also the political definition of the grounds on which struggles are
to be fought. In this sense, location has more to do with the active constitution of the grounds on which political
stances, than with the latitude and longitude of experiences of circumscription, marginalisation and exclusion.
The idea of location does not suggest, therefore, that the grounds on which struggles are defined are permanent,
fixed and universal. Instead, underlying this idea is a sense that space is discrete and discontinuous, but also
relational and close. Location is both the ground which defines struggle and a highly contested terrain, which
cannot provide any secure grounding for struggle. Location is simultaneously about unity and difference, about
definitions of who occupies the same or a similar place and who does not, which do not presume - and, further,
undermine the presumption - that there is a sameness of their struggle. Engagements in the politics of location,
further, involve the defmition of boundaries - but once more, these are not to be seen as fixed, impermeable and
permanent. Neighborhood territorializations can form the basis or re-forging identity across the national borders
ofglobal diasporas. The politics of identity is undeniably also a politics ofplace (Pile & Keith, 1997).
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The Muslims living in Umhlanga Halls and Umhlanga Crest have various reasons for their
decision to move to gated communities and each person has his/her own individual
psychological justification. Some say their reasons are purely societal and that they move for
security reasons and fear of crime. Others claim that the resale value of their properties is the
reason why they move to gated neighbourhoods. On a personal level, reasons varying from
control of environment, sense of security and safety and exclusion are prevalent. The need to
remain 'pure' by living far away from those 'other' Muslims living in Chatsworth or
downtown indicate that the rich Muslims of predominantly Tablighi Jamaat use social
splitting to remove the bad 'things' from their living environment as much as they can by
means of urban segregation. Whatever their reasons, the Muslims residing in gated
communities have defied the norm by choosing to locate themselves in areas which not only
resemble very closely those of the Apartheid system, but which are also still very much
predominantly white. By adopting the urban residential values of a minority of rich white elite
South Africans, the Muslims are unconsciously or consciously re-creating the past, only this
time the segregation and separation takes place closer to home, amongst their fellow Muslims.
While I do not claim to speak on behalf of the people with whom I had the pleasure to work
during my fieldwork, I hope that the insight provided by my research will enable readers to




Aljaff - Low people
Ashraf - Noble class
Azaan - The formal call to prayer in Arabic
Barelwi - The Indo-Pakistani version of the ideological branch characterising Indian diaspora
globally. The Barelwi branch advocates for a more cultural and populist adherence to Islam
with its various reference and practice of cultural festivals.
Bid'ah - Innovations in Islam as per Islamic orthodoxy
Biradari - Fraternity ofIndian Muslims based on their Indian village of origin
Daawah - Public propagation ofIslam
Deobandi - The other major Indo-Pakistani ideological branch which calls for a strict
adherence to Islamic principles and lifestyle, without giving much weight to cultural customs
and traditions.
Dhobi - Washennan
Duah - Individualised or collective prayers to God
Hadiths - Sacred Islamic texts
Haraam - Forbidden by Islamic Law
Hijab - Female Muslim headscarf
ICO - Islamic Conference Organization
Imam - Religious head of a mosque and its congregation in general, but also understood as a
leader in a community
Jilbabs - Long dress for Islamic wear
Jummah - A special Friday prayer
Kabaria - Greengrocer
Kutum - Joint household
Madrasah - Islamic school/institution from where Islamic knowledge is partaken
Maulana - Priest
Mawloods - Group gatherings ofpeople belonging to the Sufi Sunni School
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Muharram - A Month in the Islamic calendar
Pirs or Peers - In popular Islam, living saints or mystics who claim divine powers to solve
problems miraculously
Qassab - Butcher
Quran - Holy Book
Salaam - Paying respects to the Prophet
Sufi - Muslim mystic
Surahs - Divine verses from the Quran
Taalim - Congregational reading ofreligious texts.
Ulema - Traditional clergy as the custodians ofIslamic knowledge
Ummah - Global communitylbrotherhood identification or brotherhood of Muslims , and
adhered to by Muslims
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